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INTRODUCTION
The United States has long operated under a dual system of
business taxation in which corporations and partnerships receive
disparate treatment. Corporations are treated as separate taxable
entities, while partnerships are ignored for most purposes. Perhaps
the most notable impact of such disparity is that income from
businesses operating in corporate form is taxed twice-first at the
corporate level when earned and a second time at the shareholder
level when distributed. Income from businesses operating in
partnership form, however, is taxed only at the partner level.' This
dual system has frequently been called unfair and inefficient,2 but
Congress has addressed only its symptoms.' The source of the
problem can be traced back over one hundred years to the adoption
of the first separate corporate income tax.'
1. I.R.C. § 11 (West 2001) (imposing a tax on corporate income); id. §§ 301,316 (imposing
a shareholder-level tax on distributions in the form of dividends); id. § 701 (explaining that
the partners, and not the partnership itself, are subject to tax).
2. The dual taxation of corporate income is considered inequitable because the tax on
income at the shareholder level is imposed regardless of the relative income levels of the
various shareholders. It is considered inefficient because the imposition of a tax on
corporations but not other business entities distorts investment decisions and encourages
inefficient behavior on the part of corporations. See CHARLES E. McLuRE, JR., MuST
CORPORATE INcoME BE TAXED TwicE? 2-3 (1979); Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A
Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 326-27 (1995); Michael J. Graetz
& Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An
Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1768 (1999); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction
in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1098-1100 (2000).
3. Several partial integration methods were attempted prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1986, including a deduction for dividends at the corporate level, a shareholder-level credit for
taxes paid by the corporation on its profits, and an exclusion for dividends at the shareholder
level. See Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax Lessons from the
Past and a Proposal for the Future, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237, 288-97 (1990). Congress has also
enacted a modified version of the partnership tax for a narrow class of corporations. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 1363(a) (West 2001) (exempting certain electing small business corporations, or "S
corporations" from the corporate income tax).
4. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 86 (1990) ("The first federal income tax statute to clearly tax
corporations was the 1894 Act."); TariffAct of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509,553.
The income tax portion of the Tariff Act was later declared unconstitutional as an
unapportioned direct tax. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); see also
Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution
and Reform, 87 YALE LJ. 90, 96-97 (1977) (describing the adoption of the "separate tax
principle" as one of the seven foundational principles ofcontemporary corporate tax law); Emil
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The traditional explanation for the original adoption of a
corporate income tax is that developments in entity theory led
Congress to consider the corporation, but not the partnership, as a
taxpayer or "entity" separate from its owners. During the Civil War
and Reconstruction, the use of corporations was still relatively
limited and the line between corporations and partnerships was
blurred by the spread of general incorporation acts. Consequently,
observers suggest that the Tariff Act of 1864,' which treated both
corporations and partnerships as conduits for purposes of the
country's first income tax, was a reflection of the view that the
corporation, like a partnership, was little more than an "aggregate"
consisting of its shareholders.6 By the end of the century, however,
the partnership view of the corporation became increasingly
inconsistent with the rise of the large corporation. Academic
theorists began to agonize over the legal personality of the
corporation.7 During the debate over the 1894 Act, this abstract and
theoretical question seemed to take on great practical importance.'
According to modem observers of this debate, it was the acceptance
of the view that the corporation was itself a separate taxable entity
AL Sunley, Corporate Integration; An Economic Perspective, 47 TAX L. REV. 621, 621 (1992)
("The U.S. corporate income tax is now almost 90 years old and, except for a two-year period
during 1936 and 1937 when a graduated surtax was imposed on undistributed profits, the
United States generally has adhered to the classical system of a separate corporate tax.")
(footnotes omitted).
5. Tariff Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223,281-85.
6. Under the Act of 1864, investors were directly taxed on their undivided share of a
business's gains and profits regardless of the form of organization. Id. Companies in certain
industries, primarily banking, insurance, and transportation, were subject to an entity-level
tax on their dividends and undistributed profits for the year, but their taxation was not
explicitly based on corporate status and distributions received from these taxable businesses
were exempt from the income of the shareholders or bondholders who received them. Id. Thus,
the Act deliberately avoided double taxation and ostensibly did not distinguish between
corporations and partnerships in the taxation of investments. The entity versus aggregate
debate continues today in the treatment of partnerships for tax purposes. See BABETTE B.
BARTON ET AL., TAXATION OF BusINEss ENTERPEiSFS 885 (1998).
7. MORTONJ. HORWrrz, THETRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 101 (1992) ("Beginning in the 1890s and reaching a high point around
1920, there is a virtual obsession in the legal literature with the question of corporate
personality.").
8. See Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 87 (indicating that, during the debates over the 1894
Act, "Congress grappled with the issue of corporate personality and whether corporations
could or should be taxed separately from individuals").
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that led to the adoption of a corporate income tax in 1894? and laid
the groundwork for the later imposition of double taxation.'
This explanation overstates the role of entity theory in the
development of the dual system of taxing business income.
Throughout the nineteenth century the corporation was viewed as
a separate entity, capable of being taxed on its income on the same
basis as an individual. This was especially true during the Civil War
and Reconstruction when the 1864 Act was in effect. States taxed
corporations as separate entities both before and after the Civil War
and the Supreme Court upheld the separate entity status of a
corporation in several state tax cases decided soon after the 1864
Act was instituted." The aggregate theory of the corporation was
not discussed until well after the adoption of the Civil War income
tax acts. Although Congressional debates over the 1894 Act were
animated by discussions regarding the nature of the corporation,'
9. The American Law Institute, for example, has indicated:
The origin of subchapters C and K and, specifically, the separate entity taxation
of corporations as opposed to the conduit taxation of partnerships, can be linked
to some extent to a debate that raged during the last part of the 19th century
and the early part of the 20th century concerning the nature of corporate and
partnership personality .... Gradually, the entity theory prevailed for
corporations but not for partnerships.
AmERacAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROEcT-REPoRTER's STUDY OF TAXATION
OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRIsES 35-36 (1999); see also Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 136
("In 1909 [when the corporate excise tax was adopted) the artificial entity theory justified
treating corporations separately from their owners and differently than individuals."); Pratt,
supra note 2, at 1057 (T]he corporate tax came into existence and was influenced by turn-of-
the-century theories of the firm."); cf. RICHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 9
(1951) ("The corporation income tax in the United States is based on the usual legal view that
a corporation and its stockholders are separate persons."); RICHARD WESTIN ETAL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OFBUSINESS ENTERPRISES 649 (2d ed. 1999) ("The U.S. separate corporate
income tax is probably based on the (mistaken) notion that corporations are legal persons or
aggregations of capital that can, do, and should pay taxes and bear tax burdens.").
10. Under the 1894 Act, shareholders were permitted to exclude from income dividends
received from corporations already taxed on their income. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28,
28 Stat. 509, 554. Thus, the 1894 Act did not itself institute a system of double taxation.
Observers suggest, however, that the entity theoryjustifications for the corporate income tax
also justified later efforts to impose double taxation. See GOODE, supra note 9, at 24-25 ("In
the legal sense, of course, the corporate and individual income taxes do not result in double
taxation. The corporation and its stockholders are different legal persons and have separate
incomes. The criticism is that there is double taxation in the economic sense.").
11. Peoplev. Commissioners, 71 U.S. (4Wall.) 244 (1866); Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 573 (1865).
12. See Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 87-90.
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entity theory was merely one of several rationales offered to justify
a corporate tax rather than a legitimate change in the under-
standing of the corporation." Moreover, Congress made no attempt
to subject corporate income to double taxation in either 1864 or
1894. Thus, there is little basis for the notion that the adoption of
a corporate income tax, and the subsequent adoption of double
taxation, was the result of a late nineteenth-century vision of the
corporation as a separate entity.
If corporations were not taxed because they were considered
separate entities, why were they taxed? This Article will establish
that the corporate income tax was originally adopted as a substitute
or "proxy" for taxing corporate shareholders directly. The rise of
intangible wealth and the increasing tax evasion associated with
this new wealth led Congress to search for alternative methods
of reaching the income of wealthy individuals. Because of its
regular and open distribution of dividends, the corporation was an
obvious target for an expansion of stoppage-at-the-source collection
efforts that had proven so successful during the Civil War and
Reconstruction. In effect, the corporate income tax was thought to
be a necessary mechanism for enforcing a comprehensive scheme of
individual income taxation.
Part I compares the federal taxation of business income during
the 1860s, the 1890s and beyond, highlighting the continuing efforts
of Congress to avoid double taxation. Part II outlines the growth of
the corporation and the development of entity theory in this country
in order to rebut the traditional view of its importance in the
development of the separate corporate tax. Part III explains how the
differences in the treatment of corporations under the 1864 and
1894 Acts are attributable to an increased interest in taxing
shareholder income and explains why this interest did not extend
to taxing partnerships as well. The Article concludes in Part IV with
a discussion of the possible reasons our current corporate income
13. The entity theory discussion occurred during debates over whether a corporation
should be entitled to the same $4000 exemption provided to individuals under the 1894 Act.
§ 27, 28 Stat. at 553. Although individuals were entitled to exclude dividends from income,
corporations did not have any exemption and therefore integration was, at best, only partial.
Id § 32, at 556.
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tax has strayed so far from its origins as a tax on shareholder
income.
I. EARLY FEDERAL REVENUE LAWS AND THE AVOIDANCE OF
DOUBLE TAXATION
A Civil War and Reconstruction
1. 1862 Act
In the face of mounting debt and a pressing need for funds to help
finance the war effort, 4 a federal income tax was first collected in
1862.' The 1862 Act imposed a tax of three percent on all income
between $600 and $10,000 and a five percent tax on incomes in
excess of $10,000.16 Although the Act did not specifically mention
income from corporate or partnership profits, it did impose a form
of withholding tax on certain businesses. A tax of three percent was
levied on all dividends issued and interest paid by railroad
corporations and a similar tax was assessed on all dividends issued
and on all sums added to surplus by banks, trust companies, savings
institutions, and insurance companies. 17 Despite the inclusion of
these provisions-in a separate section, they were generally regarded
as a part of the income tax."
Although the simultaneous enactment of an income tax on
individuals and a dividend tax on businesses could have been
structured to impose a double tax burden, Congress actively sought
14. Prewar debt was almost $75 million in 1861. JOHN F. WEra, THE Poircs AND
DEVELOPMENTOFTn FEDERALINCO1mETAX67 (1985). With the onset of war, the burden grew
while traditional revenue sources tightened. Id at 68.
15. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473. The first federal income tax was
actually adopted in 1861. Act of August 5,1861, ch. 45,12 Stat. 292,309. At the beginning of
the Civil War, however, Salmon Chase, Lincoln's Treasury Secretary, made no effort to assess
or collect any taxes under this Act, rendering it a dead letter. Steven A. Bank, Origins of a
Flat Tax, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 329,345 (1995).
16. § 90, 12 Stat. at 473.
17. Id §§ 81-82.
18. Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q. J. ECON. 416,427 (1894). Sections 89-
93 were listed under the heading "Income Duty," while the dividend and interest taxes were
included under the headings "Railroad Bonds" and "Banks, Trust Companies, Savings
Institutions, and Insurance Companies." §§ 89-93, 12 Stat. at 469-75.
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to avoid this result. Double taxation was a particularly sensitive
charge for supporters of the income tax. As Representative Justin
Morrill noted when introducing the bill on behalf of the Ways and
Means Committee, one of the principal concerns regarding the
general income tax was that it burdened wealth that was already
taxed by anotherjurisdiction. 19 In protesting a related provision, one
representative typified these concerns by declaring "I do not think
that the Government should derive double taxation from the same
property for the same period of time. That is a proposition, the
correctness of which I think every member will concede." 0 Others
confirmed this statement, calling double taxation "not just" and
proposing amendments to avoid this result wherever appropriate. 1
Not surprisingly, given this anti-double-tax sentiment, Congress
enacted measures to minimize the double tax risk in the business
context. Principally, shareholders and bondholders were permit-
ted to exclude from their income the receipt of dividends and
interest from corporations already taxed under the Act. 2 This, of
course, was not a perfect solution. Unlike the income tax itself, the
rate was not graduated and there was no exemption for share-
holders with incomes below $600.' While the latter problem was
19. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1196 (1862) (statement of Rep. Morrill) ("The
income duty is one, perhaps, of the least defensible that... the Committee of Ways and Means
concluded to retain or report. The objection to it is that nearly all persons will have been
already once taxed upon the sources from which their income has been derived.").
20. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1534 (1862) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (offering
an amendment to a proposed inheritance tax that would relieve all property taxed during life
from taxation at death).
21. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1527 (1862) (statement of Rep. Sherman)
(proposing to exempt mortgages from tax because of concerns about double taxation); see also
id. at 1486 (statement of Rep. Eliot) (proposing amendment to relieve savings banks from tax
on dividends arising from earnings received on bank stock holdings); id. at 1545 (statement
of Rep. Stevens) (protesting property tax on stocks and bonds as a double tax when combined
with an income tax, explaining "[if the pending amendment is adopted, we ought to strike out
the income tax altogether, and insert this in its place, for I believe there is no single item in
the gentlemen's amendment that is not taxed in the shape of income"); id. at 2555 (statement
of Sen. McDougall) (objecting that tax on insurance companies would be doubled because of
the reinsurance industry); id. at 2573 (statement of Sen. Howe) (proposing an integration
scheme for the manufacture of alcohol).
22. § 91, 12 Stat. at 473-74.
23. The lack of an exemption produced some inequities. Hill, supra note 18, at 427-28.
Individuals with incomes in excess of $10,000 would be taxed at three percent on dividends
on interest from railroads and other such corporations, but at five percent on all other income.
Conversely, individuals not subject to the income tax because their income was less than $600
454
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controversial, 2' albeit rare in occurrence,' the former problem was
partially alleviated by administrative practice. George S. Boutwell,
the first Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued a regulation
instructing the assessors of the income tax to assess an additional
two percent tax on individuals with income in excess of $10,000 who
received dividends and interest from taxable corporations.26
The 1862 Act did appear to impose a separate tax upon certain
corporations in the form of a gross receipts tax. Under section 80 of
the Act, businesses operating railroads, steamboats, and ferry boats
were required to pay a three percent tax on the gross amount of
their receipts.' The provision, however, applied regardless of
whether the business was incorporated.' It also explicitly permitted
the affected company to pass along the amount of the tax to their
customers in the form of higher fares. 29 Thus, if the business chose
to pass on the tax, it was arguably more like a sales tax than a
tax on the business itself. Even if it paid the tax without raising
rates, however, it was still more similar to a proxy tax because
would still pay at a three percent rate on dividends and interest from specified businesses
because the withholding tax was not relieved for dividends and interest paid to lower income
taxpayers. Id. One commentator has explained the absence of an exemption for taxes paid by
corporations on dividends and interest as an administrative problem. See HARRY EDwiN
SMrIr, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAXHISORYFRoM 1861 To 1871, at 55 (1914)
("The law made no provision for exemptions of any kind in these taxes paid by corporations,
for, as the tax was to be assessed in a lump sum on all money paid out as interest or
dividends, it seemed impracticable to Congress to permit this deduction.").
24. HAROLD Q. LANGENDERFER, II THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1861 TO 1872, at 507-09
(1954).
25. ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERvIcE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1861-1913, at 279 n.74 (1993) (suggesting that the number of
individuals whose total income fell below the exemption level but paid the tax withheld on
corporate dividends must be statistically insignificant given the low proportion of income tax
revenues attributable to the dividend provisions).
26. GEORGE S. BOUTWEm, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 197 (1863); SMIrH, supra note 23, at 55. This addressed the inequality of
taxing five percent taxpayers at a three percent rate on corporate income, but it did not
address the reverse problem of taxing zero percent taxpayers at a three percent rate. See
StoNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMEMCA 75 (Octagon Books 1980) (1942).
27. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 80, 12 Stat. 432, 468-69.
28. Id.
29. Id., 12 stat. at 469 ("Provided, That all such persons, companies, and corporations
shall have the right to add the duty or tax imposed hereby to their rates of fare....").
2001] 455
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
shareholders were entitled to exempt from income the receipt of
dividends from corporations subject to the gross receipts tax.30
2. 1864 Act
Between 1862 and 1864, the country's financial position worsened
and the public debt grew to over $1 billion.3 ' Revenue from the 1862
Act had been disappointingly low;32 Congress focused more of its
efforts on the income tax in hopes of bolstering its financial
condition.33 Under the 1864 Act,' Congress increased the individual
income tax rate to five percent on incomes between $600 and $5000,
seven and one half percent on incomes between $5000 and $10,000,
and ten percent on incomes in excess of $10,000.3' Unlike the
income tax provisions in the 1862 Act, which did not mention
income from corporate or partnership profits, the 1864 Act spec-
ifically included them in income. Under section 117 of the 1864 Act,
"the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or
partnership, other than the companies specified in this section, shall
be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any
person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise." 6 The
Commissioner interpreted this latter phrase to permit taxation of
shareholders on the undivided profits of a corporation,37 but soon
30. 1& § 91.
31. LANGENDERFER, supra note 24, at 451; RATNER, supra note 26, at 80.
32. RATNER, supra note 26, at 82.
33. See Hill, supra note 18, at 423 ("This act [the 1864 Act] was the most important
revenue measure of the war, and was expected to produce revenue of about $250,000,000.").
34. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 116-123, 13 Stat. 223, 281-85.
35. Id. § 116. Before the 1864 Act went into effect, however, Congress eliminated the
middle bracket and imposed a ten percent tax on all incomes in excess of $5000 in an effort
to further increase revenues. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469; Hill, supra note 18,
at 425; Taylor, supra note 3, at 262. Apparently, the need arose because new estimates
suggested that the receipts from the 1864 Act would fall far short of projections made at its
introduction. See STANLEY, supra note 25, at 35.
36. § 117, 13 Stat. at 282.
37. See DIGESToFDEciSIONSANDREGULATIONSMADEBYTHE COMMISSIONEROFINTERNAL
REVEME, 1864-1898, at 16, 36, 37, 39, 40 (1906). Although the principal challenges
surrounding this provision applied to corporate profits, the provision actually applied to the
undistributed profits of both corporations and partnerships. It appears that some limited
partnerships operated under a corporate model and agreed not to allow funds to be distributed
prior to the liquidation of the partnership. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 57. When faced with
such a situation, the Commissioner ruled that each partner was required to report his or her
456 [Vol. 43:447
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after adoption of the 1864 Act this reading of the statute was
challenged in court. Eventually, the Supreme Court considered
the issue in Collector v. Hubbard.' The Court agreed, albeit in
dictum, that the phrase "whether divided or otherwise" meant that
a corporation's undistributed profits were generally taxed as income
to its shareholders as if they had been received by the shareholder
as a dividend or liquidating distribution.39 Thus, regardless of a
business's form of organization, its owners were taxed on a conduit
basis.
In the 1864 Act, Congress deviated from the pure conduit
approach with respect to "taxable" businesses assessed under the
1862 Act. These included banks, trust companies, savings insti-
tutions, and insurance, railroad, canal, turnpike, canal navigation,
and slackwater companies.'4 Such businesses were subject to a
tax of five percent on all dividends as well as "all undistributed
sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus
or contingent funds."" Additionally, certain businesses were sub-
ject to a five percent tax on interest paid pursuant to bonded
indebtedness.'2
Despite the increased pressure to raise revenue, Congress sought
to avoid imposing double taxation.' As with the 1862 Act, several
measures were enacted with this goal in mind. At the company
share of profits as income, as if a distribution had been made. Id.
38. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).
39. Id. at 16-18 (dictum). The Court struck down the challenge, indicating that it was
barred on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 14-15.
40. §§ 120-122, 13 Stat. at 283-85. Although it is likely that most such businesses were
conducted in corporate form, the critical distinction between these taxable businesses and
other businesses was the specified industry rather than the form of organization.
41. Id. § 120.
42. Id. § 122. Such businesses included railroad, canal, turnpike, canal navigation, and
slackwater companies. Id One commentator has speculated that the reason banks and
savings institutions were excluded from this list was due to concerns about vertical equity.
See Taylor, supra note 3, at 261 n.131 (noting that railroad and other transportation
companies issued bends in large denominations, while banks had many depositors with
incomes below the $600 exemption).
43. On several occasions during the debates over the 1864 Act, members of Congress
expressed a desire to avoid imposing a double tax burden, although they often raised the
charge where it was of doubtful applicability. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
2730 (1864) (statement of Sen. Harris) (protesting the gross receipts tax on express companies
because it would impose a double tax burden on already taxed railroad companies that used
express companies).
20011 457
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level, taxable businesses were permitted to deduct amounts
previously taxed, such as undistributed sums, from the tax due on
the dividend." At the investor level, investors were permitted to
exclude dividends and interest received from taxable businesses.5
Despite these efforts, the 1864 Act did not completely integrate the
business/investor income taxes with respect to these taxable
businesses. Most seriously, the 1864 Act imposed a flat five percent
entity-level withholding tax on dividends and interest from taxable
businesses while imposing a graduated tax with an exemption for
incomes under $600 and a top marginal rate of ten percent on
income from other sources. As originally introduced by the House
Ways and Means Committee, the income tax portion of the 1864 Act
proposed a flat five percent tax on all income, including income from
dividends and interest.' Graduated rates were later added to the
individual income tax sections during the debates in Congress, but
no similar change was made to the taxation of the specified
businesses on their dividends and interest.47 Although some have
suggested that this failure to adjust the business rates may have
been merely a legislative oversight,4" the more likely explanation for
this disconnect is the administrative difficulties of imposing a
graduated tax at the business level.4'
The 1864 Act, as amended, remained in effect until the end of
Reconstruction in 1872.0 Some thought the income tax should be
retained as part of a general overhaul of the federal revenue
44. § 121, 13 Stat. at 284.
45. Id § 117.
46. EDwIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INcoME TAX 440 (1911).
47. Id. at 441; Taylor, supra note 3, at 264.
48. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 264.
49. See SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 444 ( he graduated principle of the income tax could,
however, obviously not be applied to the dividends and interest tax, and it was for this reason
that the proportional rate of five per cent was imposed."). Discussing the same provision
under the 1865 Act, one authority noted that
[dlividends, salaries, and interest were subject to a straight five per cent
withholding tax on all amounts above $600. In other words, the progressive
feature did not apply to these sources of income even though Congress had had
several years experience with the tax The apparent reason seems to have been
the problem of administration.
LANGENDERFER, supra note 24, at 475.
50. Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate
Income, 68 N.C. L. REv. 613,618 n.23 (1990).
458 [Vol. 43:447
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system.51 The general sentiment, however, was that the income tax
was an emergency measure that should exist only so long as the
lingering financial effects of the war continued to be felt.52 Each of
the acts passed from 1864 through 1867 thus contained a provision
stipulating that the income tax would remain in effect until 1870
and no longer.5" After receiving a short reprieve, the income tax
ultimately expired after 1872.s" Financial prosperity and the
declining national debt combined to drain the income tax of its
original wartime imperative.55
B. 1894 Act
Although political support for an income tax continued after the
end of Reconstruction,56 it was not successfully revived until after
the Panic of 1893."1 The high rates instituted by the McKinley Tariff
in 1890 had already focused attention on the inequity of the current
revenue system.5" Coupled with the unrest occasioned by the Panic's
economic dislocation, 9 the time was ripe for another attempt at an
income tax. In early 1894, Democrats attached an income tax
amendment to the Wilson Tariff Bill in the House.6 ' After much
51. See, e.g., JOHN SHERMAN, SELECTED SPEECHES AND REPORTS ON FINANCE AND
TAXATION, FROM 1859 TO 1878, at 319 (1879) ("[Ihe modification or repeal of the income tax
should be postponed until, by a general revision of our whole revenue system, we can
determine what taxes bear most heavily upon the people, and distribute the reduction so as
to give them the greatest relief."). David Wells, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stated
in his annual report of December 1869 that he was in favor of continuing the income tax.
SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 456.
52. RATNER, supra note 26, at 121-27; STANLEY, supra note 25, at 45.
53. ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAxEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1940).
54. RATNER, supra note 26, at 126-27; Kwall, supra note 50, at 618 n.23.
55. See STANLEY, supra note 25, at 54.
56. See WrrTE, supra note 14, at 70; Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special
Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIsT. 607, 608
(1985). Fourteen different income tax bills were introduced in Congress between 1873 and
1879. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 565 (2d ed. 1985).
Representative Benton McMillin of Tennessee introduced bills to reinstitute an income tax
virtually every year from 1879 through the early 1890s. RATNER, supra note 26, at 172.
57. WrrrE, supra note 14, at 70.
58. Id.; Baack & Ray, supra note 56, at 609.
59. RATNER, supra note 26, at 170; WrrrE, supra note 14, at 70.
60. 26 CONG. RFc. 1594 (1894) (statement of Rep. McMillin); Baack & Ray, supra note 56,
at 609; George Tunell, The Legislative History of the Second Income-Tax Law, 3 J. POL. ECON.
311, 311(1895).
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political wrangling, including an attempt to separate the income tax
provision from the larger tariff bill,61 the 1894 Act was passed by
Congress and became law.62
Under the income tax provisions of the 1894 Act, Congress
abandoned the graduated tax employed during the Civil War and
Reconstruction in favor of a flat rate. All incomes in excess of
$4000 were taxed at a rate of two percent per year.' As the high
exemption suggests, however, the tax was still aimed primarily at
the wealthiest segment of society.64 Perhaps a more significant
change was that Congress specifically imposed a tax on corporate
income. As passed in the House, this provision was fairly similar to
the dividend tax employed during the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Following the model of the 1864 Act, a two percent tax was first
imposed on the "dividends" and "undistributed sums, or sums made
or added during the year to [the] surplus or contingent funds" of
certain banks and insurance companies." The innovation lay in
extending this tax to cover all corporations or limited liability
61. RATNER, supra note 26, at 173; STANLEY, supra note 25, at 113.
62. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509. The Act passed over the objections of and
without the signature of President Grover Cleveland. KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, INCOME
TAXATION: METHODS AND RESULTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 259 (1910); Taylor, supra note 3,
at 268. Cleveland's objections arose primarily from disagreements over the Democrats'
compromise on tariffrelief. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 53, at 17 (The President was
thoroughly disheartened at the emasculation of his tariffreform bill and at his own betrayal
at the hands of Senators of his own party;, indeed, he was so outraged that he refused to sign
the measure."). Cleveland, however, "kept Congress in session the required ten days so that
the measure became law without his signature." Id.
63. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 27, 28 Stat. at 553.
64. Taylor, supra note 3, at 268. The tax was expected to affect no more than one-tenth
of a percent of the population. STANLEY, supra note 25, at 133, this 3-7.
65. Section 59 of the House Bill provided, in relevant part:
There shall be levied and collected a tax of 2 per cent on all dividends in scrip or
money thereafter declared due, wherever and whenever the same be declared
payable to stockholders, policy holders, or depositors or parties whatsoever,
including nonresidents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings,
income or gains of any bank, trust company, savings institution, and of any fire,
marine, life, inland insurance company, either stock or mutual, under whatever
name or style known or called in the United States or Territories, whether
specially incorporated or existing under general laws, and on all undistributed
sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent
funds ....
26 CONG. REC. 6831 (1894).
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business enterprises. Specifically, the House bill provided that the
tax would apply to
all dividends, annuities, or interest paid by corporations or
associations organized for profit by virtue of the laws of the
United States or of any State or Territory, by means of which
the liability ofthe individual stockholders is in anywise limited,
in cash, scrip, or otherwise; and the net income of all such
corporations in excess of such dividends, annuities, and interest,
or from any other sources whatever ....
As with the 1864 Act, all entities taxable under this provision of the
House bill were required to deduct and withhold from any dividends
paid the amount necessary to pay the two percent tax.67
In the Senate, the corporate tax provision was further removed
from its 1864 Act form. Rather than imposing a tax on dividends
and undistributed profits, the Senate Finance Committee version of
the bill imposed a tax directly on the net income of corporations. In
another variation, the Senate bill specifically set forth those
corporations that were not subject to the tax. These included states
and municipalities as well as corporations organized for charitable,
religious, or educational purposes.6 In contrast to the 1864 Act,
therefore, the Senate bill subjected all corporations to the tax, while
exempting certain corporations where the application of the tax
would rest upon questionable constitutional or political footing.
69
Ultimately, the Senate version of the corporate income tax provision
prevailed. Under section 32 of the 1894 Act, a two percent tax was
imposed on all "corporations, companies, or associations doing
business for profit in the United States, no matter how created and
organized, but not including partnerships."70
66. Id.
67. Id
68. I& This was not necessary in the 1864 Act because its income tax provisions specified
the industries to which the tax would apply. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 271.
69. See 26 CoNG. REc. 6621 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hill) (questioning the
constitutionality or prudence of taxing certain public or quasipublic corporations).
70. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. In full, the statute provided:
That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein otherwise
provided, a tax of two per centum annually on the net profits or income above
actual operating and business expenses, including expenses for materials
purchased for manufacture or bought for resale, losses, and interest on bonded
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The simultaneous income taxation of individuals and corporations
was unprecedented at the federal level, but there was no evidence
of the intent to double tax corporate income through this system. In
fact, the evidence is quite to the contrary. The anti-double tax
sentiment was at least as high or higher than it had been during the
Civil War and Reconstruction. Entire pamphlets were dedicated to
the subject and their rhetoric was highly charged. One pamphleteer
wrote that "those features of our tax laws which involve double
taxation ... violate the principles at the foundation of all systems of
taxation; namely, justice or equality, certainty, efficiency, and
economy.""' Another asserted that "[tihe folly, injustice, and
demoralization which go with our present attempts at double
taxation are first to be assailed. 2 Other sources, though treating
the subject more even-handedly, were similarly consumed with
double taxation."
Double taxation concerns were evident during consideration of the
corporate income tax provisions of the 1894 Act. One senator stated
pointedly, "if I ufiderstand the bill, as it stands now there is to be
double taxation; first, the dividends are taxed as the income of
corporations, and then they are taxed when they reach the stock-
holders."74 Members of Congress were quick to point out that the
corporate income tax was deliberately structured so that it would
complement rather than overlap the individual income tax. Section
28 of the Act excluded from income those dividends received
from entities already taxed under the Act. 6 As under the 1864 Act,
and other indebtedness of all banks, banking institutions, trust companies,
savings institutions, fire, marine, life, and other insurance companies, railroad,
canal, turnpike, canal navigation, slack water, telephone, telegraph, express,
electric light, gas, water, street railway companies, and all other corporations,
companies, or associations doing business for profit in the United States, no
matter how created and organized, but not including partnerships.
'C.
71. GEORGE GLOVER CROCKER, AN EXPOSITION OF THE DOUBLE TAXATION OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN MASSAcHUSmm'S 3 (1885).
72. J.P. QUINCY, DouBLE TAXATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 4 (1889).
73. See FRANCIS WALKER, DOUBLE TAXATION IN THE UNTED STATES 9 (1895); Edwin R.A.
Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations 111, 5 POL. Sc. Q. 636 (1890) ("[Ihe problems that
hinge about this particular subject [double taxation] are so especiallyimportant in the United
States as to demand the most serious attention.").
74. 26 CONG. REc. 6876 (1894) (statement of Sen. Dolph).
75. See id (statement of Sen. Hill).
76. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 554.
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however, this was only a partial solution because the entity-level tax
could not be avoided by reason of the individual-level $4000
exemption.7" For shareholders with incomes below the exemption
level, the tax on corporate income thus imposed an indirect tax
where none should have been imposed at all. At least with respect
to the possibility of double taxation of corporate income, however,
Congress was clear in its intent to avoid it.
The 1894 Act's primary innovation was to impose an income
tax on corporations directly. Although the 1864 Act had imposed
both a gross receipts tax and a dividends and undistributed profit
tax on businesses operating in certain industries, these businesses
ostensibly were not specifically targeted because of their corporate
status. The 1894 Act was thus the first to impose a true "corporate"
income tax. Because of a challenge to the constitutionality of the
1894 Act, however, this innovation in federal income taxation was
not implemented. Almost immediately after the Act took effect on
January 1, 1895, two shareholder suits were filed in federal court
in New York to prevent their respective corporations from paying
the tax.' Eventually, the Supreme Court declared the income
tax unconstitutional as an unapportioned direct tax in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.79 Arguably, the Court could have
concluded that the corporate income tax provision was permissible
yet still struck down the individual income tax.0 On rehearing,
however, the Court emphasized that notwithstanding the existence
77. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 269.
78. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court under the name Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). As originally filed, the other case was Hyde
v. Continental Trust Co. See WITTE, supra note 14, at 73 n.14 (discussing the consolidation of
the cases).
79. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 572. Article I of the Constitution provides: "No Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, c. 4. The rule of apportionment, a
compromise borne in part out of the divide between small and large states and in part out of
the question of how to count slaves, requires that direct taxes such as poll or property taxes
be apportioned between the states according to each state's population. SELIGMAN, supra note
46, at 594. In this manner, large and powerful states are prevented from causing the national
government to impose all the taxes on citizens of the smaller states. See generally, Erik M.
Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes". Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97
CoLU% L. REV. 2334, 2380-89 (1997) (discussing dangers of general taxes and constitutional
limitations).
80. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 271-72.
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of certain potentially valid provisions, the income measure was void
in toto.8
1
The Pollock case was only a temporary bump in the road to a
corporate income tax. In 1909, soon after it sent the Sixteenth
Amendment to the states for ratification, 2 Congress passed a
corporate excise tax as part of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act.'
Although styled as an "excise tax," it was effectively an income tax
because the excise was measured by a corporation's net income.
Because it was not accompanied by an individual income tax,
however, the double tax risk was minimized. Upon ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment, a corporate income tax was adopted once
again as part of the individual income tax imposed under the
Revenue Act of 1913." Just as in the 1894 Act, double taxation was
avoided by excluding dividends from the individual income tax base.
This method of integrating the corporate and individual income
taxes served as a model until the dividend exclusion was removed
in 1936.' Since that time, Congress has employed a variety of
different methods of partially alleviating the burden of double
taxation, but it has never seriously considered eliminating the
corporate income tax itself.
The development of a separate corporate income tax was
motivated by a number of factors, but a desire to double tax
corporate income was not one of them. Opposition to double taxation
ran deep during the latter half of the nineteenth century and income
tax proponents sought to avoid any appearance of injustice.
Consequently, both experiments with a federal income tax during
this period-during the Civil War and Reconstruction and during
the early 1890s-were deliberately structured to minimize the risk
of double taxation.
81. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 635-37.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see RATNER, supra note 26, at 292-93.
83. Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
84. RATNER, supra note 26, at 335-36.
85. Kwall, supra note 50, at 619-20.
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II. THE ENTITY-THEORY EXPLANATION FOR THE CORPORATE
INCoME TAx
If Congress did not enact a separate corporate income tax in order
to tax corporate income twice, why did it enact such a tax at all? The
transformation from a pass-through system of business taxation
during the Civil War and Reconstruction to a separate corporate
income tax system in the 1894 Act and subsequent revenue
measures was a striking shift in approach. Whereas the 1864 Act
did not distinguish between income from corporations and
partnerships, choosing to attribute both to the business's owner for
tax purposes, the 1894 Act taxed corporate, but not partnership,
income at the entity level.
What accounts for this change? The traditional explanation is
that it was due in large part to developments in the nature of the
corporation and in our understanding of its legal personality. A
recent American Law Institute report on the federal income taxation
of private business enterprises reflects this traditional view, stating
that the "[entity] theory of business-organization personality
influenced the income-tax rules that developed" for corporations and
partnerships.' The 1864 Act's failure to impose an income tax on
corporations suggested to the Reporters that "as of the time of the
Civil War period, there was no clear indication that corporations
should be treated any differently from partnerships for income-tax
purposes."'7 By the time a corporate income tax was adopted in the
1894 Act, however, this attitude appeared to have changed. Between
the end of Reconstruction and the adoption of the 1894 Act, the
underlying attributes of a corporation and a partnership under state
law began to diverge. "Legal theory, following these basic differences
between a corporation and a partnership, veered toward a natural
entity theory in the corporate area, but resisted it, at least partially,
in the partnership area."' Under the traditional view, the triumph
86. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 36-37; see also George K. Yin, The Future
Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141, 145 (1999) (reflecting same view).
87. AMERICAN LAW INSITUTE, supra note 9, at 37; Yin, supra note 86, at 146.
88. AMEICAN LAW INSTITtrE, supra note 9, at 36 (quoting Kornhauser, supra note 4, at
57-62).
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of the entity conception of the corporation necessitated its taxation
as a unit separate and distinct from the taxation of its owners.89
From these supposed origins, entity theory continues to provide
the foundation for our separate system of corporate income taxation.
Until quite recently, the tax system relied upon the distinguishing
state-law features of a corporation to determine which business
enterprises would be subject to corporate income tax 0 As one
former Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared, "[tihe separate-
ness of the corporate personality or the corporate entity is one of the
cornerstones of our present income tax law."9' Perhaps just as
importantly, traditional entity theory appears to explain, at least
partially, the continued popular and political support for the double
taxation of corporate income. 2 One significant problem with the
traditional entity-theory explanation for the origins of the corporate
tax, however, is that it is historically inaccurate. As suggested
below, advances in the theory of corporate personality appear to
have had only a modest influence, if any, on the taxation of the
corporation during the three major periods of the corporation's
89. See GOODE, supra note 9, at 12 ("These economic developments stemming from the
legal nature of the corporation provide a partial answer to the argument that the
separateness of the corporation and its stockholders is only a convenient fiction of the legal
mind.").
90. In 1997, the Department of the Treasury adopted "check-the-box regulations," which
permit business enterprises to elect their tax classification under the Code. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3 (1998). Under the former "corporate resemblance" test, the tax classification of
business enterprises was determined by testing for the presence of four corporate
characteristics designed to replicate the criteria used under state corporation law. See Steven
A. Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger: Toward an End to the Anachronistic Reliance on
State Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1307, 1364-67 (1999).
91. Mortimer M. Caplin, Comment, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business
Organization: Is It Time for a 'Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REV. 249, 252-53 (1961).
92. As Arlen & Weiss explain:
In one view, the double tax persists because the public views corporations as
distinct entities, not merely as vehicles for transferring profits to shareholders.
According to this theory, the public supports the double tax because it believes
that all individuals, including corporations, should pay taxes on their income.
The entity theory was indeed the original basis for imposing a separate
corporate tax.
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 2, at 331; see also William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal
Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13, 54 (1972) (stating that the personification of the corporation
was "a significant element in the public's support of the law imposing the [corporate income]
tax"); Pratt, supra note 2, at 1106-07 (noting that polling data suggests that "the public thinks
of the corporation as having taxable capacity and its own income, separate from its
shareholders").
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development in the nineteenth century: (1) the special charter era
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, (2) the advent of general
incorporation statutes prior to the Civil War, and (3) the growth of
the large corporation at the end of the century.
A Special Charters and the Early History of the Corporation
1. Development of the Grant or Concession Theory
The separate entity concept developed early on in human
civilization as a method of distinguishing between an aggregation
of individuals and the groups formed by such individuals.93 During
the Medieval Period, this concept was readily used to describe
villages, towns, churches, and trade guilds. 4 Although such groups
admittedly existed only through the residence and attendance of
their respective members, they were nonetheless thought of as
separate entities in their collectivist dealings with the outside
world.9" As Professor Arthur Machen explained: "Any group ...
whose membership is changing, is necessarily an entity separate
and distinct from the constituent members.' In this sense,
however, classifying a group as an entity may be viewed as "merely
an abbreviated way of writing the names of the several members,"
and thus be considered nothing more than an intellectual construct
of little practical significance. 7
An artificial entity transcends this descriptive quality and
becomes real to the extent an authority recognizes it as such. The
93. As one commentator put it:
The conception of a number of individuals as a corporate or collective entity
occurs in the earliest stages of human development, and is essential to many of
the most ordinary processes of thought. Thus, the existence of tribes, village
communities, families, clans, and nations implies a conception of these several
bodies of individuals as entities having corporate rights and attributes.
1 VICTOR MORAWEr1, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1, at 2-3 (2d ed.
1886).
94. 1 ARTHURW. MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4,
at 4 (1908); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655, 667 (1926).
95. MORAWETZ, supra note 93, § 1, at 2-3.
96. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 259 (1911).
97. JOSEPH K ANGELL& SAMUELAMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE § 6, at 4 (9th ed. 1871); Machen, supra note 96, at 257.
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Church was one of the first authorities to attempt to confer official
recognition upon entities. During the height of ecclesiastical power
in the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV advanced an
organizational conception of divine authority.9" Under his vision,
God created the Church in an effort to organize and harmonize
society. The Church in turn was the sole body empowered to
concede to individuals the right to create lesser entities or
associations.' Thus, an entity existed only through a grant of
authority from the Church. Although it eventually shared this
power with the State, the competition for authority intensified.
Organizations such as feudal trade guilds and communes,
municipalities, trading companies, and business organizations such
as corporations began to rival the claims of the Church or the State
to supremacy in their respective spheres.' 0 The most effective
manner of beating back such individual and collective threats
to their sovereignty "was to treat all minor organizations as
'conjurations' and conspiracies, except as they derived all their
powers from an express grant of supreme power."'0 ' This strategy
sought to justify the supremacy of the Church and the State by
marginalizing nonapproved entities and placing them outside the
organizational hierarchy.
From this history emerged the grant or concession theory of the
corporation. According to this theory, "there is no capacity to act as
a body corporate without positive authorization."' 2 In England, this
came to mean a grant of authority from the King or Parliament.
According to Blackstone in his famous study of the English common
law, "the king's consent is absolutely necessary to the erection of
any corporation, either impliedly or expressly given."' 3 The cor-
poration was thus considered a "franchise" or privilege to establish
98. SHAW LrMOR, EAmY AMEICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON
CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT 10 n.4 (Octagon Books 1968) (1939); Dewey, supra note 94, at 665-
66; Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity"
Theory, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 575,588 (1989); GregoryA Mark, Comment, The Personification
of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1469 (1987).
99. Mark, supra note 98, at 1469.
100. Dewey, supra note 94, at 667.
101. Id. at 666.
102. ERNEST FREUND, STANDARDS IN AMEmCAN LEGISLATION 39 (1917).
103. 1 WnLLIAM BLACKRlONE, COMMENTARIES *472.
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an independent legal person. 1' Frequently, the royal charter
transmitting the grant of authority also constituted a concession of
power to the corporation to conduct activities normally reserved
for the sovereign. This was because it was necessary to enlist the
corporation as an arm of the Crown, especially in the case of
corporations engaged in foreign trade because the "royal charter
legitimized a range of public functions performed by such trading
companies in organizing terms of trade, setting up local govern-
ments, controlling customs, and, in effect, making foreign policy in
their areas of operation." 5 Although royal charters were arguably
sought for private benefit by trade guilds such as the weavers,
goldsmiths, haberdashers, fishmongers, vintners, and merchant
tailors,"o the primary purpose of even these charters was to advance
the political interests of the Crown by serving as regulatory bodies
for their respective trades."0 7
Not surprisingly, the grant or concession view of the corporation
found new strength amidst the grab for power in America.1°8 While
universities such as Dartmouth College and the foreign trading
companies that founded many of the colonies existed by virtue of
royal charters, locally inspired corporations "all claimed legitimacy
by grants from colonial governors or legislatures."' ° In some cases,
these local chartering bodies exercised their authority through a
104. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPoRATIoNAND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 128 (1932).
105. JAMES WALARD HURST, THE LEGTMACY OF THE BUSIE CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNrrED STATES 1780-1970, at 4 (1970); see also GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE
POSITION OF FOREIGN CoRPoRAToNs IN AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 11 (1918) ("In
partibus infdelium, the corporations were themselves an arm of sovereignty, exercising
political and diplomatic functions."). According to one observer, the East India Company, a
prominent British trading corporation, "for a time in effect constituted the government of
India." JAMES S. COLEMAN, POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCmry 27 (1974).
106. HURST, supra note 105, at 4.
107. As Professor WiUiston explained:
The guilds or companies ... made by-laws governing their respective trades,
which were not simply such regulations as a modem trade-union might make,
since any one carrying on a trade, though not a member of the guild of that
trade, was bound by its by-laws .... In short, the guilds exercised a power
similar to that exercised by the municipal corporations ....
Samuel Williston, History of the Law of the Business Corporations Before 1800,2 HARv. L.
REV. 105, 108-09 (1888).
108. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Editor's Introduction to LiVERMORE, supra note 98, at x-xiii,
XXV.109. HURST, supra note 105, at 15.
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delegation of the Crown's prerogative, n" but when English rule
ended, any prerogative ended as well.' The newly formed states
hurried to establish their claims to authority by filling this void."2
Individuals desiring a charter had to apply to the state legislature
for a special act of incorporation. Special charters were of necessity
voted on one-by-one, and the powers granted were carefully limited
to those needed for the business or project to be undertaken by the
individuals making the application."
As in England, the American corporation was viewed as a
creation of the state by virtue of its grant of a corporate charter.
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"4 Chief Justice
Marshall described the corporation by borrowing from Blackstone
and other English legal theorists:" "A corporation is an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."" 6 Reinforcing this
grant or concession theory of the corporation was the fact that
special charters were often reserved for those activities promoting
110. Initially, the Crown had a difficult time asserting its authority over colonial
government chartering efforts, as it took nearly fiftyyears to establish the existence of a royal
prerogative. See Simeon E. Baldwin, Private Corporations 1701-1901, in Two CENTURIES'
GRowTH OFAMERIcAN LAW 1701-1901, at 261,264 (Yale Law Faculty eds., 1980) (1901).
111. 1 MACHEN, supra note 94, § 2.
112. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government had no power to charter
corporations. See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusINEss ENTERPRISES 16 (1961). During the constitutional convention in 1787, James
Madison twice proposed giving the federal government a power of incorporation, but his
proposals were defeated because of fear that it would permit Congress to create national
monopolies. Id; HENDERSON, supra note 105, at 19-20.
When Congress did attempt to issue a federal charter to the Bank of North America in
1781, its power to do was implicitly questioned by the Bank, which also secured a charter in
its home state of Pennsylvania and in several other states. HENN, supra, at 16 n.4.
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 188-89; Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to
General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst's Study of Corporations, 49 Am U. L. REV.
81, 84 (1999); see HAROLD F. LUSK, BUSINESS LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 694 (1946).
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
115. HURST, supra note 105, at 9.
116. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 634. Because of Justice Marshall's description of the
corporation, the grant or concession theory is sometimes called the "fictional" or "artificial"
entity theory of the corporation, but all of the names tend to signify the same thing. David
Graver, Comment, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate Personhood, 6 U. CHI.
L. SCE. ROUNDTABLE 235, 237-38 (1999).
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the public good. Although the demand for corporate charters in
America was exceedingly light prior to 1780,117 corporations re-
ceiving charters during the burst of activity prior to the turn of
the century were overwhelmingly "quasi-public" n8 in operation.
According to Willard Hurst:
Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted from
1780 to 1801 in the states, nearly two-thirds were for enterprises
concerned with transport (inland navigation, turnpikes, toll
bridges); another 20 per cent were for banks or insurance
companies; 10 per cent were for the provision of local services
(mostly water supply); less than 4 per cent were for general
business corporations. 9
117. HURST, supra note 105, at 7; LIVERMORE, supra note 98, at 61; MACHEN, supra note
94, § 14. One explanation for this lack of demand was the aftermath of the Bubble Act's
application to the colonies in 1741. See HURST, supra note 105, at 8; HENN, supra note 112,
at 14-16. In the Bubble Act, adopted by Parliament after the "bubble" burst on financial
speculation in the South Seas, the grant of corporate charters was severely restricted. Id In
both England and America, businessmen avoided the Act by using deeds of settlement to form
joint-stock companies. Id
118. Or, as Shaw Livermore describes them, "semi-political." See LIVERORE, supra note
98, at xxvii.
119. HURST, supra note 105, at 17; see also BERTE & MEANS, supra note 104, at 10 ("In 1800
the corporate form was used in America mainly for undertakings involving a direct public
interest: the construction of turnpikes, bridges and canals, the operation of banks and
insurance companies, and the creation of fire brigades."); RoBERT HEILERONER & AARON
SINGER,THEECONOMICTRANsFORMATION0FAMERICA 1600TOTHEPRESENT 183 (2d ed. 1984)
("The early colonial settlers had corporations for the performance of certain activities, such
as charity work and other activities that were associated with the public welfare."); Baldwin,
supra note 110, at 276 (noting that "[o]f the charters granted prior to 1800 for moneyed
corporations, two-thirds were of a quasi-public character"). Other writers suggest that
America produced a much higher number of business corporations during this period. See, e.g.,
Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins oftheAmerican Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON.
HIST. 1, 4 (1945) ("[Bjy contrast to English and Continental experience, the less advanced
economy of the United States produced almost 350 business corporations between 1783 and
1801."). This discrepancy, however, may be due to the fact that these latter numbers do not
distinguish between quasipublic businesses and general businesses. As one commentator
notes:
Although many corporate charters granted after 1800 for canals, turnpikes, and
banks went to private business entrepreneurs, these corporations did not
operate as private businesses in the same sense as unincorporated businesses.
To encourage much needed improvements, the early special charters normally
granted privileges in the form of monopolies or franchises, causing these early
corporations to resemble more closely towns' public bodies rather than private
competitive businesses.
Hamill, supra note 113, at 93 n.51.
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This bias in favor of quasipublic corporations arose in part out
of the belief that the performance of a public service was deemed to
be a precondition for the grant of a corporate charter.120 One
Virginia Supreme Court Justice wrote in 1809 that special acts of
incorporation "ought never to be passed, but in consideration of
services to be rendered to the public."" To satisfy this requirement,
many early special charters declared the public usefulness of their
enterprise in the preamble.122 This is not to say that the entities
themselves were public or necessarily had public powers; rather, the
early American corporation was private but received its charter in
exchange for performing a public service12'
2. Taxation of Corporations as "Persons"
As a creature of the state endowed with special privileges, one
would expect the corporation to be an object of special attention
from taxing authorities. 4 In reality, despite the corporation's grow-
ing importance during the early 19th century, legislatures made
no special provisions for their taxation. In fact, corporations were
treated as ordinary persons for the purposes of most tax provisions.
Entity theory appears to have had little influence.
Perhaps because of the relative rarity of the corporate form, early
tax laws contained no references to corporations. 5 Legislators
appeared to assume there was little reason to distinguish between
120. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 97, § 13, at 7; GEoRGE HEBERTON EvANs, JR., BuSINESS
INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNTrED STATES 1800-1943, at 21 (1948).
121. Currie's Admin. v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315,347 (1809).
122. EVANS, supra note 120, at 21 n.21.
123. MORTON J. HoRwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 112-13
(1977). Self-destruction clauses and the threat of quo warranto actions both emphasized the
public benefit requirement of early special charters and served to ensure the proper use of the
privileges associated with such charters. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in
American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1659, 1660 n.443 (1988). Justice Story observed:
A private corporation created by the legislature may lose its franchises by a
misuser or a non-user of them; and they may be resumed by the government
under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto to ascertain and enforce the
forfeiture. This is the common law of the land, and is a tacit condition annexed
to the creation of every such corporation.
Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50 (1815).
124. See Pratt, supra note 2, at 1097 (suggesting that corporate taxation was sometimes
justified as payment for the special privileges of operating as an artificial entity).
125. EDwIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 138 (1895).
472 [Vol. 43:447
ENTITY THEORY AS MYTH
corporate and noncorporate property because property taxation
itself did not depend upon the status of the holder. 6 Obviously,
this assumption was not always a valid one. In Massachusetts,
for example, a manufacturing corporation resisted the application
of a tax assessed in 1817 for the support of the church parish in
which the corporation's plant was located.?7 The attorney for the
corporation argued that because "corporations have no souls" for the
parish to save, the tax cannot possibly apply to them. 8 In rejecting
this argument, the court not only noted that a tax is not like a fee
that may be charged only to those who benefit from it, but it also
pointed out that a corporation benefits just as much as an individual
when its "[p]roperty is made more secure both by the education of
children, and the religious and moral instruction of adults." 19 A
subsequent change in law, however, called this justification into
question.
Under a statute enacted by Massachusetts in 1823, property could
only be assessed in the parish or other religious society in which the
property's owner was a member. so The tax, then, could not possibly
serve to protect the property of a nonresident or nonparish affiliated
owner. When the parish tax was challenged as imposed against a
manufacturing corporation in 1830, l31 the corporation's attorneys
argued that because none of the shareholders belonged to the parish
in which the property was located, the property should be exempt
from the tax.3 2 The court rejected this partnership or aggregate
view of the corporation, concluding that a corporation is "an
independent legal person" and the owners of its stock are not the
owners of its real estate.33 Because the corporation itself did not
belong to any other religious society, the exemption did not apply.
Perhaps recognizing the awkward nature of this logic, the court
noted in a footnote that the legislature had in the interim enacted
126. See id.
127. See Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53 (1820).
128. Id at 53-54.
129. Id. at 55.
130. Goodell Mfg. Co. v. Trask, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 514,515 (1831) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 106, § 3 (1823)).
131, Seeid
132. Id. at 515. In fact, each of the shareholders belonged to different religious
denominations altogether. Id. at 516.
133. Id. at 517.
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a statute providing that "no corporation shall be taxed for any
parochial purpose."'3
Even when some states decided to clarify the treatment of
corporations under their tax laws, it was generally to make explicit
that corporations should be treated like persons for purposes of
taxation. New York did little more than underscore the broad
applicability of its tax laws when it enacted the first provision
regarding the general taxation of corporations in 1823.5 Under
the law, "all incorporated companies, receiving a regular income
from the employment of capital, shall be considered persons
within the meaning of this act, and assessments shall be made and
taxes imposed, levied and collected in the same manner as upon
individuals."" 6 There were special provisions providing for a
corporation's payment of the tax, '3 but nothing altered the way the
tax applied to a corporation as opposed to an individual. This
pattern was repeated in the states that followed New York's
example.1" In fact, several states adopted constitutional provisions
mandating that corporations be taxed like individuals for property
tax purposes.13 9
There were a few exceptions to this early tendency to tax
corporations like individuals, but, if they signified anything, they
tended to disprove any connection between corporate status and
taxation. Banks have long been singled out for special treatment by
taxing authorities. As early as 1805, Georgia imposed a two and a
half percent tax on the capital stock of banks and a one and a half
percent tax on their total amount in circulation.' ° A few states
134. Id at 518 n.1.
135. See SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 138.
136. Act ofApril 23, 1823, ch. 267, § 14, 1823 N.Y. Laws 390,395 (1823).
137. Corporations were required to submit a list of taxable assets and were permitted to
pay the tax by deducting from dividends or by paying ten percent of all dividends, profit or
income. I& § 15.
138. States following New York's law included Connecticut in 1826 and Massachusetts in
1832. Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations I, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 269,273 (1890);
see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 569 (noting that railroad corporations were taxed under
the general property tax prior to 1850).
139. States adopting constitutional provisions requiring that corporations be taxed like
individuals included Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, and South
Carolina. See Seligman, supra note 138, at 273 n.3.
140. The Georgia law established that
there shall be a tax of two and an half per cent. levied and collected on the
amount or capital of any bank or banks, office or offices of discount and deposit
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followed suit, relying principally on the taxation of bank capital
stock or dividends.' Insurance companies were also treated dif-
ferently in some jurisdictions. In 1824, New York enacted the first
such statute, taxing foreign fire insurance companies at a ten
percent rate on all premiums for property located in New York.'
When other states imposed similar taxes on foreign insurance
companies, Massachusetts enacted what came to be known as a
"reciprocal act" in 1832.' This legislation provided that if any state
taxed a Massachusetts insurance company doing business in that
state, the insurance companies of that state would be subject to a
similar tax on policies sold in Massachusetts.' Although the early
taxation of banks and insurance companies clearly differed from the
taxation of individuals, the difference does not appear to reflect a
decision to treat corporations differently for tax purposes. In both
cases, taxation was based on the type of activity conducted rather
than the form of organization."5
While there were antebellum instances of corporate taxation,
they were isolated at best. The first state to impose a tax on
corporations on account of their corporate status was Pennsylvania.
An 1840 statute provided that "banks, institutions and companies
whatsoever, incorporated by or in pursuance of any law of this
commonwealth" must pay a tax on their capital stock based on the
amount of dividends or profits.1 6 Maryland imposed a "tax on
within this state, and the further sum of one half per cent. On the amount of
bills issued from any such bank or office of discount and deposit, over and above
the amount or capital as aforesaid....
Act of Dec. 4, 1805, § 3, 1805 Ga. Laws 19,20.
141. See, eg., Act of Mar. 18, 1814, ch. 98, § 10, 1813-14 Pa. Laws 154, 169 ("[Elach of the
said banks shall transmit six per cent. on the whole amount of the dividends which shall have
been declared on said day and during the preceding year ... ."); Act of June 4, 1830, ch. 28,
§ 2, 1830 Conn. Pub. Acts 305, 306 (stating banks and insurance companies shall "cause to
be paid... a sum equal to one third of one per cent. of the value of all of the stock of their
respective institutions... ."); SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 143-45 (discussing direct taxation
of banks).
142. SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 150.
143. Id. at 151.
144. Id
145. For instance, in Pennsylvania, unincorporated savings banks were taxed in the same
manner as incorporated full-service banks. Id. at 149-50. The tax was based on a percentage
of net earnings rather than on the amount of capital stock outstanding. L
146. Act of June 11, 1840, No. 232, 1840 Laws of Pennsylvania 612, 612; see SELIGMAN,
supra note 125, at 166. It was not until the 1860s that the statute became a truly general tax
on corporate dividends or income. See DELOS 0. KINSMAN, THE INCOME TAX IN THE
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incorporated institutions" in 1841, but it merely extended the
general property tax to a corporation's capital stock. 147 These
statutes, however, are notable more for their lack of imitators than
for signaling a shift in the approach to the taxation of corporate
income and assets."8 Almost twenty-five years passed before other
states followed Pennsylvania's lead.149 The early taxation of the
corporation does not therefore demonstrate a tendency to tax
corporations differently on account of their special privileges and
status.
B. The Democratization of the Corporation
Two related developments threatened the corporation's special
status under the grant or concession theory. First, general in-
corporation statutes began to replace the special charter as the
principal means of incorporating a business. Second, and perhaps
because of the first development, individuals in manufacturing and
other nonpublic enterprises began to select the corporate form to
conduct business. In both cases, the result was to question the
distinctive nature of the corporation. Neither of these developments,
however, affected the taxation of the corporation.
1. General Incorporation and the Introduction of the
Partnership Theory
Although the special charter may have been a necessary device to
encourage development in early America, it became a symbol for
something much worse in Jacksonian America.' ° In 1833, William
COMMONWEALTHS OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1903).
147. Seligman, supra note 138, at 303; Act of Apr. 1, 1841, ch. 23, § 17, 1841 Md. Laws
(1841).
148. Virginia enacted a two and a half percent tax on corporate dividends in 1843, but it
was reduced in 1846 and subsequently eliminated altogether. Seligman, supra note 138, at
304.
149. See id. at 301-04. States may have chosen not to imitate Pennsylvania's corporate tax
in part because of its relatively modest results. See T.I, Worthington, Historical Sketch of the
Finances of Pennsylvania, in 2 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 172-
73 (1887) (noting that the measure in which the corporation taxes were enacted was expected
raise, in the aggregate, no more than five or six hundred thousand dollars per year and in fact
raised considerably less).
150. See HURST, supra note 105, at 30.
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Gouge summarized the emerging sentiment by commenting that
"[als the object of charters is to give to members of companies
powers which they would not possess in their individual capacity,
the very existence of moneyed corporations is incompatible with
equality of rights.""' Critics of the special charter system objected
both to the special charter itself and to the franchises or special
privileges granted to those receiving a charter.5 2
Many objected to the whole system of incorporating by the
authority of a special charter. Because of the barriers to
incorporation and the appearance of impropriety under a special
charter system, special charters were charged with fostering the
existence of a new aristocracy in America and corrupting state
legislatures. 5 ' While such sentiments were intimately connected
with Jacksonian Democratic politics, they resonated for many
throughout the antebellum period. Amasa Walker, a Free Soiler and
Republican, argued at the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention
in 1853 that "this system of corporations is nothing more nor less
than a moneyed feudalism."1" Defenders answered charges by
pointing to the need to encourage investment, 55 but the Jacksonians
advocated the democratization, rather than the termination, of the
process of incorporation. They argued that if the corporate entity
was an appropriate vehicle for conducting business, it should be
equally accessible to everyone." 6
151. WaiuAm M. GouGE, SHORT HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA
41 (1833).
152. Id at 31, 33.
153. See Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Ante Bellum Political
Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1893 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Incorporating the Republic];
Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90
YALE L.J. 1833, 1844 (1981) [hereinafter Note, The Corporation and the Constitution].
154. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CrWL WAR 22 (1970).
155. See Note, Incorporating the Republic, supra note 153, at 1893-94.
156. See HURST, supra note 105, at 32; THEODORE SEDGWICK, WHAT IS A MONOPOLY? 13
(1835); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution, supra note 153, at 1844 n.62. This
Jacksonian argument in favor of the democratization of the incorporation process stood in
contrast to the Jeffersonian attack against the corporate entity itself. Political economist and
noted Jeffersonian Thomas Cooper claimed that
these institutions are founded on the right claimed by government to confer
privileges and immunities on one class of citizens, not only not enjoyed by the
rest, but at the expense of the rest.... Generally in this country, it has glutted
itself by incorporating banking companies, insurance companies, canal
companies, and manufacturing companies of various descriptions. All these are
4720011
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The special charters grant of exclusive franchises further
offended the prevailing egalitarian sentiment of Jacksonians. s7
Although a long tradition of opposition to special privileges had been
brought over from England in the 1700s,' Andrew Jackson's
campaign against the Second Bank of the United States in 1832 was
a high point for this sentiment in America."s9 Jackson's substantive
critique ostensibly related to other matters, but it was primarily a
war against special privileges.'ce In Jackson's veto message on a bill
to recharter the bank, he argued that "when the laws undertake to
add to [the] natural and just advantages [possessed by men]
artificial distinctions, to grant ... exclusive privileges, to make the
rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of
society ... have a right to complain of the injustice of their
Government."161 This was not merely a protest against the national
chartering of corporations in general or of the bank in particular;
rather, it was an attack on the system of granting exclusive
privileges.
Particularly offensive to the Jacksonian vision of the independent,
entrepreneurial common man was the special charter's conferral of
monopoly privileges. As early as 1792, opposition to New Jersey's
increasing daily....
THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONoMY 246 (2d ed. 1830); see
also Hovenkamp, supra note 123, at 1634 (explaining the Jacksonian view of the corporation).
157. Jacksonians viewed equality of opportunity and open competition as the torchlights
for an enlightened economy. See Note, The Corporation and the Constitution, supra note 153,
at 1844 n.62.
158. See HENDERSON, supra note 105, at 19 ("The identification of incorporation with the
grant of special and exclusive privileges or monopolies, and the fear that the corporation
would infringe on the 'natural rights' of citizens, was the chief source of the early opposition
to corporations."); LIvRmORE, supra note 98, at 247 ("As early as 1784 the attitude
erroneously identified by historians as Jacksonian was clearly existent ... ."); Note,
Incorporating the Republic, supra note 153, at 1890 ("T]here was a tradition of statutory and
common law hostility to granting trading companies and craft guilds special privileges to
carry on particular trades.").
159. See JAMES C. CURTis, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE SEARCH FOR VINDICATION 114, 130
(1976).
160. Jackson's other criticisms ofthe bankrelated to its excessive issuances ofpaper money
and its power to speculate and thereby create or exacerbate a panic. Id at 112-15; HURSr,
supra note 105, at 116.
161. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The
Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV.
603, 611 (1991) (quoting Jackson's veto message concerning the bill to recharter the national
bank).
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grant of a charter to one of the period's first manufacturing
corporations was based on the grounds that "no citizen will think of
giving seven years of the prime of his life to acquire the knowledge
of any profession in which he may be supplanted by a junto of
monied men, under the immediate patronage and protection of the
Government." 162 By the 1830s, the rhetoric had strengthened, as
illustrated by the following attack on the corporate charter system:
Every corporate grant is directly in the teeth of the doctrine of
equal rights, for it gives to one set of men the exercise of
privileges which the main body can never enjoy. Every such
grant is equally adverse to the fundamental maxim of free trade,
for it carries on its face that none but the corporators are free to
carry on the trade in question, with the advantages which the
charter confers.163
In response to such concerns, Jackson's Attorney General, Roger
Taney, concluded that states had no legal power to grant
monopolies.' After his appointment to Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Taney provided support for this position in Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.' Holding contrary to the accepted
wisdom,' Taney wrote for the majority that a corporate charter did
not imply the grant of a monopoly or other special privilege, and
therefore, the legislature was not prohibited from granting a charter
to a rival bridge corporation.'67 Even Justice Charles Story, in
dissent, agreed that not "every grant to a corporation becomes, ipso
162. GEORGE LOGAN [A FARMER], FIVE LETTRS ADDRESSED TO THE YEOMANRY OF THE
UNITED STATES 20 (1792). Logan called the charter one of the most unjust and arbitrary laws
to be enacted by the Commonwealth of New Jersey that ever disgraced the government of a
free people-A law granting to a few wealthy men the exclusive jurisdiction of six miles
square, and a variety of unconstitutional privileges, highly injurious to the citizens of that
state." Id. at 10; see also JOSEPH STANCLIFF DAVIS, 1 ESSAYS IN TEE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 349 (1965) (discussing New Jersey's chartering of The Society for
Establishing Useful Manufactures).
163. SEDGWICK, supra note 156, at 13.
164. Hovenkamp, supra note 123, at 1615.
165. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
166. See HUGH Ru ILFRASER, DEMOCRACY iN THE MAKING: THE JACKSON-TYM ERA 55
(photo. reprint 1969) (1938) (depicting Jackson's measures to prevent the formation of
monopolies, particularly the Second Bank of the United States).
167. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 536.
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facto, a monopoly or exclusive privilege."16 The decision reflected
the Jacksonian desire to promote equal competition among
individual businesses.
The cumulative effect of this criticism of the special charter
system was to spur the development of general incorporation
statutes. 69 Although early statutes were enacted for a variety of
reasons, 170 general incorporation statutes for business corporations
were primarily designed to make the corporate form available to a
wider segment of the population.'17 Connecticut passed one of the
first truly general incorporation acts in 1837 and twenty-four of the
thirty-eight existing states followed suit in the 1840s and 1850s.'72
By 1886, one commentator declared that a general incorporation law
168. Id at 638 (Story, J., dissenting).
169. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 2 (1991);
Hamill, supra note 113, at 101. On the other hand, Shaw Livermore argued that although the
public campaign for general incorporation laws did emphasize the political opposition to
special privileges, the result was the effect of an evolutionary process in the needs of the
business organization. See LIVERMORE, supra note 98, at 295-96.
170. The earliest general incorporation statutes were more the result of the pressures on
state legislatures from the increasing applications for special charters during the last two
decades of the eighteenth century than from an egalitarian spirit. In 1800, New York's
governor lamented the legislature's preoccupation with the consideration of applications for
special charters at the expense of other business. RONALD E. SEAvoY, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855, at 40 (1982). In 1806, a subsequent New York
Governor repeated the earlier charge, suggesting that the legislature could avoid the problem
"by establishing general principles on which all such companies shall in the future be
incorporated." Id. at 41 (quoting Governor Morgan Lewis). In 1807, New York adopted a
general regulatory statute for turnpikes and in 1811, New York passed a general law for the
formation of certain types of manufacturing corporations. See N.Y. LAwS ch. 67, 111 (1811);
Louis K Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,548 n.2 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); MACHEN,
supra note 94, § 15; SEAVOY, supra, at 40; Note, Incorporating the Republic, supra note 153,
at 1898.
Much of the later force behind the general incorporation movement, however, was the
desire to equalize the chartering process. Although one approach would have been to cut off
special charters without instituting a general method of incorporating, the effect of this
"would have been to intensify the very features of monopoly and exclusive privilege which
were the targets of Jacksonian attack. The logical outcome of egalitarianism was
incorporation equally available to all: not fewer corporations, but more." Davis, supra note
161, at 611 n.36 (citation omitted).
171. According to Joseph Davis, even early general incorporation statutes for nonbusiness
corporations such as ecclesiastical, educational, and literary entities were enacted out of "a
strong and growing prejudice in favor of equality." DAVIS, supra note 162, at 610.
172. Act of June 10, 1837, ch. 63,1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49 (permittingincorporation of"any
... lawful business"); Hamill, supra note 113, at 101-02.
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"is now in force in some form or other in almost every State of the
Union."173
At first, such statutes existed simultaneously with the special
charter system and contained many restrictions and limitations on
permitted purposes, maximum authorized capital, duration,
maximum indebtedness, and other powers.17' Because of the ability
to secure a charter on more favorable terms than under the general
statute, however, many larger organizations still applied for and
received such charters through special enactments. 75 This created
a dual regime that was not unlike the system prior to the enactment
of the general incorporation statutes. Several states sought to limit
such special charters to avoid what Justice Brandeis referred to as
"the scandals and favoritism incident to special incorporation."
176
In 1821, New York amended its constitution to require two-thirds
approval from each branch of the legislature for any act "creating,
continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or corporate."77
In the very next session, however, special charters were issued to
thirty-nine New York corporations, suggesting more drastic
measures were necessary.'78 The solution was to ban the issuance
of such special charters altogether, which New York did by amend-
173. General Corporation Acts: Their Origin, 20 AM. L. REV. 757, 758 (1886) (quoting
Edward Everett Hale).
174. HENN, supra note 112, at 17; HURST, supra note 105, at 33; Hamill, supra note 113,
at 107, 122.
175. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 195. For example, in Wisconsin between 1848 and 1871
corporations formed by special charter outnumbered corporations formed pursuant to the
general incorporation statute by nearly eight to one. Davis, supra note 161, at 613 n.46.
176. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In New
Jersey, the governor attempted to veto several special charters issued to manufacturing
companies in the early 1850s after the adoption of a general incorporation act, but was
unsuccessful. JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY. BUSINESS AND
PoLIcs 1791-1875, at-33 (1949). Hurst reports that in fact such favoritism did not occur, at
least with respect to the ultimate question of gaining a charter. HURST, supra note 105, at 136
("Legislative journals show that substantially all who sought incorporation obtained it....
Most variations in charter texts were variations of operational arrangements conveying no
implication of sinister ends against public interest."). As Hurst admits, however, "the major
incidents did not concern the grant of corporate status but the grant of other franchises
enabling the grantees to engage in some action barred to the general public or to be free of
legal burdens which would attach to the general public." Id. at 137.
177. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 548 n.3 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting the law granting the
charters). Similar provisions were includedin the Delaware Constitution of 1831, the Florida
Constitution of 1838, and the Michigan Constitution of 1835. Id.
178. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 97, § 65, at 48.
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ing its constitution in 1846.179 One year earlier, Louisiana had
inserted a clause into its constitution providing that "[clorporations
shall not be created in this State by special laws except for political
or municipal purposes'--a provision which Iowa copied in 1846.' °
In fact, almost every state constitutional convention held after
1840 considered provisions limiting the issuance of special charters
as states tried to unburden themselves from the fiscal ruin of
excessive subsidization." While there was still resistance to
general incorporation in some states, most notably New Jersey, the
pressures to end special chartering eventually prevailed in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. 2 By 1880, twenty-seven
states had adopted constitutional provisions prohibiting the
issuance of special charters, and by 1913, all but four of the states
had adopted such provisions."
As general incorporation statutes became increasingly more
liberal, the corporation became the vehicle of choice for nonpublic
enterprises. Beginning in the 1830s, manufacturing company
incorporations began to catch up with transportation and other
quasipublic incorporations.' In New Jersey, for example,
179. Id.
180. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 196.
181. SEAVOY, supra note 170, at 180; Davis, supra note 161, at 618-19. Accordingto Ronald
Seavoy, the primary impetus for New York's constitutional amendment in 1846 was the
massive public debt accruing under the weight of the legislature's very generous and subsidy-
laden special charter system. SFAVOY, supra note 170, at 177. In the wake of the financial
crisis of 1837-1844, states could no longer stand to bear this burden. Id. at 180.
182. See CADMAN, supra note 176, at 437. According to one study, "not until about 1875 had
constitutional provisions requiringincorporation under general laws become so numerous that
special charters might be considered a thing of the past for most fields of enterprise in most
states of the Union." EVANS, supra note 120, at 10.
183. The four remaining states were Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island. EVANS, supra note 120, at 11 tbl. 5; Davis, supra note 161, at 613 n.47. Susan
Pace Hamill has recently conducted a study that disputes the data from earlier studies
regarding the precise timing of the adoption of constitutional prohibitions on special
chartering. See Hamill, supra note 113, at 121-28. Hamill agrees, however, that "[flrom 1904
until 1915, the practice of incorporation by special charter entered into a phase marked by
substantial and consistent decline. ... By 1916, special chartering neared complete
insignificance." Id. at 135-36; see also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional
Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 129, 146-61 (1985)
(providing a public choice theory-based explanation for the endurance of special charters until
the era of interjurisdictional competition).
184. Initially, legislatures expected that even manufacturing corporations should be at
least tinged with the public interest. See EVANS, supra note 120, at 20 (citing the example of
the first manufacturing business incorporated in New Jersey, "The Society for Establishing
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manufacturing and mining incorporations accounted for thirty-two
percent of all incorporations between 1820 and 1844, and in
Wisconsin, such charters overtook quasipublic charters between
1848 and 1871.185 This is not to suggest, however, that the progress
toward general business incorporation was steady or uniform. In
Pittsburgh, for instance, none of the 161 manufacturing businesses
in operation in 1860 was incorporated, even though Pennsylvania
had adopted its first general incorporation statute for certain
manufacturing enterprises in 1836.1' In Massachusetts, only 520 of
the approximately 11,000 manufacturing businesses in existence
were incorporated by 1878, although it is perhaps more significant
that those businesses that had incorporated were responsible for
over one-third of the commonwealth's manufacturing output. 7 It is
safe to say that by the late 1880s, state incorporation laws primarily
served the general business enterprise.1 m
Eventually, the spread of corporations to nonpublic enterprises
and the adoption of general incorporation statutes suggested a
conceptual shift in the nature of the corporation. On one hand, the
enactment of a system of general incorporation by statute rather
than as a matter of right emphasized the continuing vitality of the
grant/concession theory, albeit in a somewhat diluted form.'8 9 On
the other hand, the right to freely incorporate seemed to necessitate
a search for a theory that recognized the general business
corporation's equality with other business associations.' As early
Useful Manufactures"). Eventually, however, the private character of these corporations was
allowed to dominate. Id.
185. See HURST, supra note 105, at 18. There was a sharp increase in the number of
manufacturing corporations in New Jersey between 1825 and 1834, and manufacturing and
mining corporations outnumbered quasipublic transportation corporations for the first time
between 1825 and 1829. CADmAN, supra note 176, at 425.
186. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 119, at 189; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., American
Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and Today, in LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS
1835-1935, at 254, 289 n.85 (1937) (discussing Act of June 16, 1836, relating to corporations
formed to manufacture iron by means of coke).
187. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 119, at 189.
188. DonaldE. Schwartz, Federal CharteringofCorporations:Anlntroduction, 61 GEo.L.J.
71, 77 (1972).
189. HURST, supra note 105, at 113 (noting the banning of special charters "was coupled
with explicit or clearly implied reconfirmation of legislative authority to determine general
policy on the availability of incorporation").
190. See Eben Moglen, The Transformation of Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1042,
1047 (1993) (reviewing HORWTz, supra nbte 7).
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as 1806, the New York Council of Revision, in an unsuccessful veto
of a bill which gave turnpike commissioners certain powers over toll
roads, reasoned along partnership theory lines that "'the rights
vested in the stockholders of a turnpike company, incorporated by
law, are as sacred and as much entitled to protection as any other
private rights."'191 It was not until the 1870s and 1880s, however,
that scholars began to view the corporation as an aggregate of its
individual stockholders, much like a partnership.
According to several modern observers, this movement had its
roots in the writings of Victor Morawetz, a well-known author who
later became a member of New York's Cravath law firm.' In the
first edition of his Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations,
Morawetz noted that "the existence of a corporation independently
of its shareholders is a fiction ... the rights and duties of an
incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the
persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being."' 3 Another
contemporary observer, Henry Taylor, concurred with Morawetz,
writing that the corporation "is a conception, which if it amounts to
anything, is but a stumbling-block in the advance of corporation law
towards the discrimination of the real rights of actual men and
women."'94 With the standardization of corporation charters and the
de-emphasis of special privileges, the law could look beyond the
corporate form to what William Bratton described as the "creative
energy of the individuals conducting it."95
191. HORWITZ, supra note 123, at 308 n.6 (quoting the New York Council of Revision). The
legislature overrode the Council's veto. Id.
192. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 90; Mark, supra note 98, at 1457.
193. MORAWErTZ, supra note 93, § 1, at 3. Morton Horwitz explained that
Morawetz's effort to disaggregate the corporation into freely contracting
individuals must have seemed at the time the only entirely logical conclusion to
draw in light of the triumph of general incorporation law. It not only dispensed
with an increasingly fictional conception of the law as a creature of the state, it
also made it possible to fit corporation law into the new dominant individualistic
mode of private contract law.
HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 90.
194. HENRY 0. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING
CAPITAL STocK § 51 (2d ed. 1888).
195. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1486 (1989).
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2. The Taxation of Corporate Wealth
Given the advent of general incorporation statutes and the
blurring of the legal or practical distinction between the corporation
and the partnership, the Civil War tax experience might be viewed
as evidence of the acceptance of the aggregate theory of the
corporation for tax purposes. Under the Revenue Act of 1864,
corporations and partnerships were explicitly subject to the same
pass-through system of taxation. Shareholders were taxed on the
undivided profits of a corporation just as partners were taxed on the
undistributed profits of the partnership.'
Notwithstanding the pass-through scheme, several factors belie
the notion that this enactment reflected an increasing acceptance
of the aggregate theory of the corporation. At the federal level,
Congress taxed the corporation as a separate entity in several
provisions of the 1864 Act. As discussed earlier,1 ' corporations in
the banking and insurance industries were subject to a five percent
tax on dividends issued to stockholders and on all undistributed
sums added to surplus or contingent funds.' s Corporations in the
transportation field were subject to a five percent tax on dividends
and interest paid on bonded indebtedness.' Additionally, the gross
receipts taxes imposed under both the 1862 and 1864 Acts were
direct taxes against corporations in the specified industries.2°
Corporations, partnerships, and persons were each treated as
separate taxable actors for purposes of the tax.2 ' Although some of
these provisions have been called mere withholding mechanisms for
the taxes on individuals, 2 they were imposed upon corporations
196. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
198. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 120, 13 Stat. 223,283-84.
199. Id. § 122.
200. See id. § 103; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 80, 12 Stat. 432,468-69.
201. E.g., § 80, 12 Stat. at 468 (imposing the gross receipts tax on "any person or persons,
firms, companies, or corporations, owning" railroads or steamboats).
202. See FREDERic C. HowE, TAXATION AND TAxES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM 1791-1895, at 96-97 (1896). Congress specifically provided that
those businesses subject to the gross receipts tax "shall have the right to add the duty or tax
... to their rates of fare." § 80, 12 Stat. at 468-69. The same proviso was included in the 1864
Act. See § 103, 13 Stat. at 276. As Senator Sherman later pointed out, "[w]e are levying taxes
on the citizens through the corporations. We make these corporations merely agents of ours
to collect the tax from individuals." CONG. GLoBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2499 (1864). "It is not
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directly, and often the corporation paid them without explicitly
passing on the cost and without the availability of a shareholder
level credit. For instance, corporations were permitted to deduct and
withhold a portion of each dividend to pay the tax,03 but were not
required to do so. In fact, most did not do so, choosing instead to pay
the tax without diminishing the payments to security holders.'
Although shareholders were entitled to deduct from income
dividends and interest derived from corporations that had already
paid the tax due on such items,2" they were not entitled to deduct
from income or receive a credit for taxes paid by the corporation
itself.2" Finally, some corporations were subject to a tax on
undistributed profits, thus reinforcing the entity-level nature of the
tax. Because of the apparent concern that banks might fail to either
issue dividends or make additions to surplus and thereby avoid the
dividends tax, those failing to make such distributions at least once
every six months were explicitly subject to a five percent tax on all
accrued or earned profits.20 7 Consequently, the tax treatment of the
corporation only dimly reflects the aggregate or partnership theory,
if at all.
a tax assessed upon the gas company," Senator Sherman continued, "so much as upon the
consumption of gas; it is a tax assessed on the consumer, and we allow the gas company to
collect from the consumer of the gas the tax we choose to impose." Id. For further discussion
on this provision, see CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1917-18 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1196, 1482, 1484,2331-33,2346 (1862). Even in industries such as insurance,
where permission to pass on the tax was not made explicit, most assumed that the costwould
be borne by the customers anyway. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2334 (1862)
(statement of Sen. Sherman) ("When a person applies for an insurance, if he pays fifty dollars
for his insurance, a tax would be added equivalent to $1.50, and that would be paid by the
insured. It is not paid by the insurance company."); id. at 2346 (statement of Sen. Fessenden)
("[The insurance companies] said it [the gross receipts tax] would come hard on those who
were insured, because they must pay it, and not the companies.").
203. §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. at 283-84.
204. Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 610,628-29 (1894) (noting that
"corporations were not compelled to deduct the tax from the dividend or interest of each
security holder, and as a matter of fact they generally assumed the tax themselves without
withholding it from the bondholder. It became to that extent a tax on the corporation, not on
the bondholder."). Even in the gross receipts tax, where corporations were given explicit
permission to pass off the cost, they may not have done so. See Kornhauser, supra note 4, at
83 n.108.
205. § 117, 13 Stat. at 281.
206. See BOUTWELL, supra note 26, at 305 (Ruling No. 29).
207. § 121, 13 Stat. at 284.
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Developments at the state level were also starkly contrary to a
partnership conception of the corporation. During this same period,
several states were beginning to follow Pennsylvania's lead and
impose taxes on corporations directly." 8 Alabama and Virginia,
for instance, both imposed taxes on the capital stock and dividends
of all domestic corporations, with Alabama enacting an income
tax in 1867 that was later held to apply to corporations. 9 The most
prominent example, however, is in Massachusetts. In 1863,
Massachusetts enacted a tax on corporate dividends paid to non-
resident stockholders.210 After this was declared unconstitutional,
21 1
the legislature elected to tax the corporation directly. Under an Act
approved May 11, 1864, corporations were taxed on the market
value of their capital stock after deducting the value of their real
estate and machinery, which was already subject to local taxation.'
The proportion of the tax corresponding to stock owned by
Massachusetts residents was credited and paid to the municipalities
in which those shareholders resided.2' The state effectively retained
only the value of the capital stock attributable to nonresidents. In
one sense, the new law merely centralized the administration of the
local shareholder tax that had been previously held to be
unconstitutional.2 14 As one commentator described it though, "[tihe
208. Seligman, supra note 138, at 303-05 (citing the examples of Alabama, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia).
209. Id.; ALA. CODE § 1(1) (1867) (stating that "the word 'person' includes a corporation as
well as a natural person"); Ala. Laws of Feb. 19,1867, § 3 (imposing an income tax on persons,
which was later held to include corporations); Ala. Laws of Feb. 22, 1866, § 2, 1 4 (imposing
a one-half percent tax "loin the capital stock actually paid in of all incorporated companies
created under any law of this State, whether general or special (except railroads) and not
exempted by their charter from such tax; except any portion that may be invested in property
and taxed otherwise as property"); id, at 15 (imposing a tax "[on all dividends declared, or
earned and not dividend, by incorporated companies created under the laws of this State,
(except railroads) to be assessed to and paid by the companies earning or declaring the same");
Board of Revenue v. Montgomery County Gas-Light Co., 64 Ala. 269, 277 (1879) (applying
income tax to corporation). None of these measures ever raised substantial sums because of
certain exceptions and a lack of enforcement. See Seligman, supra note 138, at 304.
210. 1863 Mass. Acts ch. 236.
211. Oliver v. Washington Mills, 93 Mass. (1 Allen) 268, 275 (1865) (holding that the tax
violated the apportionment clause of the commonwealth's constitution).
212. 1864 Mass. Acts ch. 208, § 5; HARRY G. FRIEDMA, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONs
IN MASSACHUSETS 47 (1907).
213. 1864 Mass. Acts ch. 208, § 8.
214. This, in itself, was no small feat. One commentator later noted that "[t]he distinctive
feature of the system of taxation of corporate property in Massachusetts is that it is
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change involved ... an important departure in principle, for it really
meant the taxation of corporations in place of individuals."2  In
1865, the state underscored the entity-level nature of the tax by
calling it "a tax upon its corporate franchise ....,216
The Confederacy's adoption of a corporate income tax measure
during the Civil War is further evidence that the corporation was
considered an appropriate taxable unit during this period. Initially,
the Confederacy relied on a direct tax on real and personal
property. 17 Because the government lacked the administrative
apparatus to administer such a tax, however, collection was left to
the individual states with predictably unsatisfactory results.21 After
a disastrous experiment with loan financing and eventually
resorting to printing paper currency to pay its bills, 9 the
Confederate government resorted to an income tax in 1863.' 0 As
part of the income tax, all corporations were required to reserve one-
tenth of annual earnings set apart for dividends and reserves. 1
When this amount exceeded ten percent of the paid capital stock,
administered wholly or in part by officers of the State, instead of by local officers .... 'It is
unique in the tax experience of the States of the Union.'" GEORGE CLAPPERTON, TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS: REPORT ON SYSTEMS EMPLOYED IN VARIOUS STATES 14 (1901) (quote
unattributed).
215. FRIEDMAN, supra note 212, at 46.
216. 1865 Mass. Acts ch. 283, § 5.
217. RATNER, supra note 26, at 102; SELGMAN, supra note 46, at 482.
218. SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 482. Only $20 million was collected during its two years
of operation and the great bulk of it was financed by the states themselves. KENNAN, supra
note 62, at 269; RATNER, supra note 26, at 102-03; EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE
NATION: 1861-1865, at 137 (1979) ("[Sltate governments undertook to pay the levies for their
citizens-largely in unsupported state currency.").
219. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1954) ("This step plunged
the Confederacy into the adventure of creating wealth out of nothing by 'magic revolutions of
the printing press' .... The Confederate Treasury became the greatest money factory in the
world.") (quoting G.C. Eggleston); SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 483-84 (stating that the
experiment with loans was no more successful than that with direct tax); THOMAS, supra note
218, at 137-38 (observing that the "folly of unsupported money" could do little to bring in tax);
J.C. Schwab, The Finances of the Confederate States, 7 POL. Sc. Q. 38, 39 (1892) (noting that
loan financing amounted to more than ninety percent of total revenues during the first few
years of the war). By January 1, 1864, the inflation rate was over six hundred percent.
THOMAS, supra note 218, at 197.
220. SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 486; THOMAS, supra note 218, at 198. By 1864, the war
taxes raised almost eleven percent of the Confederacy's total revenues, a figure that compares
favorably with the fifteen percent raised by taxation in the North during the same period. See
Schwab, supra note 219, at 41.
221. SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 487.
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the government imposed a 12.5% tax and when it exceeded twenty
percent of paid capital stock, the tax rate increased to 16.66%.
222
This provision did not result in double taxation because
stockholders were permitted to exempt from income all dividends
received from such corporations.'
When this income tax measure failed to satisfy the Confederacy's
growing revenue needs, the Commissioner of Taxes recommended
a further increase in the rates. This specifically included an
attempt to increase the tax on corporate profits. In a report issued
in November of 1863, the Commissioner suggested a tax of fifty
percent on the profits of all corporations beyond that necessary to
support a dividend of twenty-five percent to their stockholders.M
According to the Commissioner, "[wihile three fourths, perhaps, of
the men of the Confederacy have dedicated their lives or fortunes,
in many instances both, to their country's cause, the remaining
fraction have no moral right to amass fortunes at their expense."22
This plea got the government's attention, and on February 17,1864,
the Confederacy enacted a more draconian income tax act.2  In this
measure, however, the Confederacy broadened the provision from
a tax on corporations to a tax on all businesses. A tax of twenty-five
percent was imposed on any business's profits in excess of that
necessary to support a twenty-five percent dividend.' This
treatment was continued in a last ditch income tax enacted in the
waning hours of the Confederacy, but surrender occurred before it
was ever implemented.2' The Confederacy's tax strategy under-
standably was guided by the need for revenue rather than the
dictates of theory.
Finally, during the same period in which all of these statutory
provisions were enacted, the Supreme Court issued its own
entity theory-based view of the corporation in Van Allen v.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id- at 489-90 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXES ACCOMPANYING THE
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 2 (1863)).
225. RATNER, supra note 26, at 105 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXES
ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 2 (1863)).
226. SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 490-91; THOMAS, supra note 218, at 264.
227. RATNE1_ supra note 26, at 106.
228. Id. at 107; PAuL, supra note 219, at 22.
20011 489
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Commissioner.229 In Van Allen, the Court addressed whether a state
could tax a bank's stockholders on the shares of stock held by them,
even though the bank's capital was invested solely in tax-exempt
United States securities.' s The stockholders argued that the tax
effectively was against the bank's capital itself, thus violating the
prohibition against state taxation of U.S. securities."s The Court
rejected this argument, concluding that the shares did not represent
an ownership interest in the underlying property. 2
Quoting from a British authority, the Court noted that "[t]he
individual members of the corporation are no doubt interested in
one sense in the property of the corporation, as they may derive
individual benefits from its increase, or loss from its decrease; but
in no legal sense are the individual members the owners.""3 The
Court thus rejected a partnership conception of the corporation,
stating that "Ithe corporation is the legal owner of all of the
property of the bank ... and ... can deal with the corporate property
as absolutely as a private individual can deal with his own.""s This
widely anticipated decision attracted much attention,' and was
cited in cases throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century
to support the notion that taxation of both the stock and the
property of a corporation was neither illegal nor double taxation."6
229. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1865).
230. Id. at 581-82.
231. Id. at 583.
232. Id. at 584.
233. Id. (quoting Queen v. Arnoud, 9 Adolphus & Ellis, New Series, 806).
234. Id at 584. The Court ultimately sided with the taxpayers because the New York
statute failed to tax shares in national banking associations on par with its taxation of shares
in state chartered banks. Id. at 581. New York then amended its statute, which the Court
later upheld relying on its reasoning in Van Allen. People v. Comm'rs, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 244
(1866).
235. E.g., Bank Items-New Jersey, 20 BANKERS'MAG. & STAT. REG. 589 (Jan. 1866); Bank
Items-Supreme Court Decision, 20 BANKERS' MAG. & STAT. REG. 900 (May 1866); Law
Reports-United States Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1866, at 2; The Taxation of
Shareholders in National Banks, By States, 20 BANKERS' MAG. & STAT. REG. 449 (Dec. 1865).
236. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 U.S. 149, 159 (1896); Bank
of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 134, 146 (1896); Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 557
(1890); New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U.S. 265,277 (1886); Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S.
129,136-37 (1886); Bradley v. Illinois, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 459 (1866); Mercantile Natl Bank v.
City of New York, 28 F. 776, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); Covington City Nat Bank v. City of
Covington, 21 F. 484, 491 (C.C.D. Ky. 1884); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 19 F. 372, 379
(S.D. Ohio 1884); Albany City Natl Bank v. Maher, 6 F. 417,420 (N.D.N.Y. 1881); Batterson
v. Town of Hartford, 50 Conn. 558, 560 (1883); Exchange Bank v. Macon Constr. Co., 97 Ga.
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C. The Advent of the Large Corporation
If the middle period of the nineteenth century is considered
important for the spread of the corporate form, the latter part
of the nineteenth century is significant for the advent of the
megacorporation. The increasing size and complexity of the new
corporation defied the partnership or aggregate view of the
corporation.
1. Natural Entity Theory and the Advent of the Big Corporation
As the general incorporation movement made the process of
securing a charter more readily available, businesses increasingly
took advantage of the corporate form. While earlier businesses were
motivated to seek a corporate charter because of the quasipublic
nature of their activities, the corporate form was particularly
attractive in the latter half of the nineteenth century for capital-
intensive businesses in search of a way to bring on new investors. 7
Corporations offered limited liability, thereby reducing the personal
financial risks of the owners.' As business enterprises expanded
1, 6 (1895); Wright v. Stilz, 27 Ind. 338, 341 (1866); Frazer v. Seibern, 16 Ohio St. 614, 620
(1866).
237. As Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means described and explained:
'It came first in the fields of public utilities, common carriers, banks and
insurance companies (which even in the 1840's were conceded to perform public
functions) and last in the areas of personal service and agriculture;--early, with
the high fixed capital costs in railways and mines; late, in mercantile pursuits
where capital consists to such a large extent of stock on hand.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 104, at 17 (footnotes omitted). Another rationale for the
formation of companies was that:
Many enterprises, not in their nature public, and many industries most
important to the development and well being of a people, require too large an
outlay of capital, to be within the means of any individual or partnership in a
new country. Such enterprises... must be undertaken by organizations in which
capital is contributed by many persons, and in small sums placed substantially
at the risk of the business.
Reform of Corporations, 32 BAN~ER's MAG. & STAT. REG. 184, 188-89 (1877).
238. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 119, at 189. One contemporary lawyer noted at a
bar association meeting that
individuals desire to form business corporations... [because] small amounts of
capital, held in many different hands, may be combined so as to form an
aggregate large enough to carry on business operations which otherwise would
not be carried on at all; both because these individuals could never be brought
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their markets and became increasingly more speculative, investors
demanded what was once thought to be the unnecessary feature of
limited liability. s 9 Furthermore, stock ownership was preferable for
investors seeking the enhanced liquidity available in corporate
ownership.24 This was not so much because there was a ready
market for corporate stock, as a truly public stock market did not
develop until early in the twentieth century,2"' but rather because
a certificate of stock could be transferred more conveniently than a
partnership interest. 2
The increasing attractiveness and accessibility of the corporate
form led to an explosion in the number of corporations in the post-
war period.4s In Massachusetts, for example, the Secretary of the
together as partners, and also because while each shareholder is willing to risk
in that enterprise the amount he invests in corporate stock, he is not willing to
incur any further liability.
General Corporation Acts: Their Origin, supra note 173, at 758-59 (quoting Henry Hitchcock).
239. Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation,
52 Bus. HIsT. REV. 30, 58 (1978). It was not until after the War of 1812 that businesses began
to seek limited liability protection for their investors. See LVERMORE, supra note 98, at 236.
Shareholders were not always provided limited liability under their corporation's charter or
the general incorporation statute. For instance, until 1830, Massachusetts imposedunlimited
liability on manufacturing enterprises seeking to incorporate. Dodd, supra note 186, at 267-
68; see also Goebel, supra note 108, at xxii-xxiii (noting that limited liability was not an
automatic feature of corporate charters).
240. Seavoy, supra note 239, at 58.
241. JONATHANBARRONBASKIN&PAULJ.MRANTI, JR.,AHISTORYOF CORPORATE FINANCE
177 (1997) ("The rise of large-scale public markets for common stocks was very much a post-
World War I phenomenon."). This is not to suggest that there was no market for corporate
stocks, since the New York Stock Exchange experienced one of its most significant periods of
growth during the 1870s and 1880s, doubling its volume and the value of traded shares.
CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET. A HISTORY 101 (1997).
242. See BASEIN & MIRATI, supra note 241, at 177 ("Earlier, equity shares were a
convenient way to transfer ownership between limited circles of business associates, rather
than instruments to support broad public dealings."). Corporate stock's liquidity advantage
may have been a vestige of the Bubble Act's prohibition on the transfer of the shares of
anything but a corporation. See LVERMORE, supra note 98, at 63-65 n.65. Although the
Supreme Court confirmed as early as 1827 that partnership interests were freely transferable
if permitted by the partnership agreement, Aivord v. Smith, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 232 (1827), it
was not until 1843 that England reversed its stance on this issue. See LIVERMORE, supra note
98, at 63-65 n.65.
243. See COLEMAN, supra note 105, at 30; EVANS, supra note 120, at 31. In some
jurisdictions, this push to incorporate preceded the Civil War. An Illinois jurist noted in 1857
that "more corporations were created by the legislature of Illinois at its last session than
existed in the whole civilized world at the commencement of the present century." ARTHUR
SELWYN MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTSANDTHEAMERICAN
CONSITrUTION 39 (1976).
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Commonwealth reported to the legislature that the rise in corporate
charters issued under the general incorporation law in, 1864
indicated "prosperity in manufacturing and mining interests, and
an appreciation by capitalists of the facilities afforded by standing
laws for the establishment of corporate bodies without the delay
involved in obtaining special charters."2 ' In Michigan, the number
of corporations rose from less than 100 in 1850 to approximately
8000 in 1894."5 Moreover, the rush to incorporate was not limited
to individual jurisdictions and industries. In its 1869 decision in
Paul v. Virginia,' the Supreme Court commented that
[alt the present day corporations are multiplied to an almost
indefinite extent. There is scarcely abusiness pursued requiring
the expenditure of large capital, or the union of large numbers,
that is not carried on by corporations. It is not too much to say
that the wealth and business of the country are to a great extent
controlled by them. 7
Although the number of new incorporations steadied as the economy
readjusted, a new spurt of incorporation took place in the 1880s and
finally stabilized in the early 1890s."
Even more significant than the increased incorporation was the
introduction of the large corporation. The early American business
corporation shared more in common with the partnership than a
true corporate organization. 9 The number of stockholders was
usually fairly small and each stockholder was intimately involved
in the daily operations of the business." Before the 1880s, even the
244. EVANS, supra note 120, at 75. The number of corporate charters issued by
Massachusetts in 1864 was more than triple the number issued in 1863. Id. at 119 tbl.
245. See John P. Davis, The Nature of Corporations, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 273, 273 n.1 (1897)
(quoting Address of President Alfred Russell at Jackson, Michigan, March, 1894, on
"Corporations in Michigan," Pubrns of Mich. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, No. 2, 97).
246. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
247. Id at 181-82.
248. See EVANs, supra note 120, at 31.
249. See LIVERMOmE, supra note 98, at 2 n.2 (distinguishing between partnership-like
corporations involving owner-managers and "true corporate bodies" involving owner-
outsiders).
250. With few employees and only one location, manufacturing enterprises required little
in the way of oversight or administration. An owner could personally oversee operations
without much difficulty. GLENN PORTER, THE RIsE OF BIG BUsINss 1860-1910, at 17-18
(1973).
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largest factories employed no more than a few hundred workers,
and even these larger enterprises were still predominately family-
owned.25' By contrast, the business corporation of the latter half of
the nineteenth century grew in size and complexity. 52 Each of the
large railroads employed more than 100,000 workers by 1890253 and
the common stock of many of the largest corporations was publicly
traded.s' The single-plant, one-function enterprise was replaced by
a multifaceted and vertically integrated operation spread over
several locations, often in different states. 5 As one modern
observer explains, these new "supercorporations" were "a genus
apart from the small, localized, family-owned companies that
characterized the early years of the republic."' Corporations were
becoming "large-scale, hierarchical business enterprises." -7 Control
increasingly became centralized in a small core of professional
managers, most of whom owned little if any stock in the
corporation.m
Paralleling this increase in the size and complexity of the
corporation was the decline of the partnership or aggregate theory
among legal scholars of the late nineteenth century. 9 As Morton
Horwitz noted, "the picture of the corporation as a contract among
individual share holders was itself becoming a nostalgic fantasy
at the very moment the partnership view was most forcefully
251. BASKN & MANTI, supra note 241, at 193; THOMAS K McCRAW, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION 64 (1984). The exception was in the railroad industry. For example, although the
three mills run by the Pepperell Manufacturing Company in Maine employed an average of
about 800 workers during the 1850s, the New York & Erie Railroad had more than 4000
employees. By the 1880s, the Pennsylvania Railroad employed almost 50,000 workers. Alfred
Chandler, The Organization ofManufacturing and Transportation, in THE ESSENTIAlALFRED
CHANDLER: ESSAYS TOWARD A HISTORICAL THEORY OF BIG BUSINESS 208-09 (Thomas K.
McCraw ed., 1988).
252. C.I YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF
GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860-1920, at 218 (1970).
253. Chandler, supra note 251, at 641.
254. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 241, at 193. According to one contemporary observer,
publicly traded corporations held nearly one-quarter of the country's wealth. ARTHUR T.
HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION, ITS HISTORY & LAWS 42 (1885).
255. JOHN O'SuLLIVAN & EDWARD F. KEUCHEL, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: FROM
ABUNDANCE TO CONSTRAINT 108 (1981); see PORTER, supra note 250, at 18.
256. MILLER, supra note 243, at 50.
257. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 241, at 167.
258. Id. at 168; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 491-92 (1977); PORTER, supra note 250, at 21.
259. HORWITz, supra note 7, at 92-93; Bratton, supra note 195, at 1490.
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put forth."2co With the success of managers in the operation of
large-scale, oligarchic enterprises, and the increasing passivity of
shareholders, it was difficult for theorists to assert that the
corporation was nothing more than the sum of its individual
members.
261
At the same time that the partnership theory's value was
declining as a descriptive tool, the nascent real or natural entity
theory began to influence the academic understanding of the
corporation. 2 Whereas the aggregate theory trumpeted the role of
the individual in the development of the corporation, the natural
entity theory viewed the corporation as greater than the sum of its
parts. One contemporary observer noted that a large corporation's
power and influence "is far greater than that of any individual, and
... the persons composing it could exert but a small part of this
influence were it not for the unification accomplished by the distinct
corporate life."' This theory appeared to draw upon and to
corroborate the claims of contemporary sociologists such as
Frenchman Emile Durkheim and others that group behavior must
be evaluated as a real, independent phenomenon that could not be
reduced to the wills of individual actors.26 As Arthur Machen
260. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 92. The same disconnect between theory and reality
occurred in England. One commentator noted that
[hloary ideas of partnership continued to confuse thinking with regard to
corporate enterprise. Partnership law ... was a barrier to a clear view of the
essential change which had taken place in the position of the investor. The
typical shareholder ... was no longer an entrepreneur in the full sense of the
word.
BIsHoP CARLETON HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BusNS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND,
1800-1867, at 129-30 (1936).
261. HORwriz, supra note 7, at 93; Bratton, supra note 195, at 1490.
262. The theory traced its roots back to 1881. In that year, philosopher Otto von Gierke
first published his study of the history of associations in Germany, a study focusing on
medieval communalism and the work of the German jurist, Johannes Althusius, and his
theory of the state as a hierarchy of constituent, purposive groups acting as psychic
organisms. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 71 (citing OTro GIEREE, DIE STAATS-UND
KORPORATIONSLEHRE DES ALTERTHUMS UND DES MrELALTERS UND IHRE AUFNAHME IN
DEUTSCHL AND, in 3 DAs DEUTSCHE GENoSSENSCHArnsRECHT (1881)); Dewey, supra note 94,
at 670.
263. Dwight Arven Jones, A Corporation as 'a Distinct Entity," 2 THE COUNsELLOR 78, 78
(1892).
264. Hager, supra note 98, at 581; see also LEON BRAMSON, THE POLITICAL CONTErr OF
SOCIOLOGY 14 (1961) (describing "Durkheim's claim for the metaphysical reality of the
group"). Moreover, it was a theory that was not inconsistent with the developing judicial
conception of the corporation. In Graham v. La Crosse and Milwaukee R.R. Co., for instance,
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described it, "[tihis personality is neither fictitious, nor artificial,
nor created by the state, but both real and natural, recognized but
not created by the law. When a company is formed by the union of
natural persons, a new real person, a real corporate 'organism,' is
brought into being."2  As a natural entity, the corporation was
ostensibly both entitled and subject to the same treatment as an
individual.2 6
2. The Taxation of the Corporation During the Dominance of
the Real Entity Theory
Supporters of the entity theory explanation for the origins of the
corporate income tax rely principally upon two features of the
legislative history of the 1894 Act to establish the theory's practical
application. First, the Senate version of the bill, which was
ultimately adopted, reflected more of a natural entity theory view
of the corporation than did the House bill.267 The House proposed to
the Court declared that "[a] corporation is a distinct entity.... [It is as distinct a being as an
individual is...." 102 U.S. 148, 160-61 (1880).
265. Machen, supra note 96, at 256. Some contemporary theorists carried this "natural
organism" analogy to excess, describing a corporation's functions in terms of organs and
attributing gender to different types of entities. An entity such as the church was considered
feminine while the business corporation or the State itself was considered masculine, a
concept which led one philosopher to raise the question of a corporation's ability to marry an
individual. See id. at n.6.
Frederic Maitland sought to definitively answer De Vareilles-Sommieres' rhetorical
questions by declaring that the real entity theory did not suggest that a corporation could do
everything a man could do:
The corporation is (forgive this compound adjective) a right-and-duty-bearing unit. Not
all the legal propositions that are true of a man will be true of a corporation. For
example, it can neither marry nor be given in marriage; but in a vast number of cases
you can make a legal statement about x and y which will hold good whether these
symbols stand for two men or for two corporations, or for a corporation or a man.
Dewey, supra note 94, at 656 (quoting 3 FREDERIC WILLIAM MArTLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS
307 (1911)).
266. See Jones, supra note 263, at 80. One author notes:
[A corporation's] [rnights are in no sense predicated of these agents or any of the
various persons or aggregations of persons who may be said to compose the
artificial person, but of it under its own name; the artificial person being under
its own name the subject of such rights, duties and penalties, and in truth and
fact, just as much a person in contemplation of law as they.
Henry Winslow Williams, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Law of Corporations-Part 1, 38
Am. L. REG. 1, 8-9 (1899).
267. See Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 87.
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tax the dividends and undistributed net income of all "corporations
or associations organized for profit by virtue of the laws of the
United States or of any State or Territory, by means of which the
liability of the individual stockholders is in anywise limited."2c By
contrast, the Senate version altered this language, imposing a tax
on the net profits or income of all "corporations, companies, or
associations doing business for profit in the United States, no
matter how created and organized, but not including partner-
ships."2 9 The House version reflects the grant or concession theory's
emphasis on the corporation's special privilege of limited liability,
while the Senate version taxes all corporations regardless of their
individual attributes. The enactment of the latter version thus
appears to lend credence to a natural entity rather than an artificial
entity or grant/concession theory explanation.270
One possible rebuttal to this argument is that the 1894 Act
permitted shareholders to exclude from income those dividends
received from corporations already taxed under the ActY.27 The
ostensible justification for this exclusion was to avoid double
taxation of corporate income. 2  One contemporary observer
explained that "the shareholder is himself a component of the
corporate person, and his dividends a portion of the net income of
the corporation.... [To tax both] can not be considered otherwise
than as double taxation of the most positive sort." 3 This, however,
268. 26 CONG. REc. 6831 (1894).
269. Act of Aug. 27,1894, ch. 349, § 31,28 Stat. 509,556. The original Senate proposal did
not include the last phrase-"but not including partnerships." 26 CONG. REc. 6831 (1894).
This language was added after discussion on the question whether the Finance Committee
intended to exclude partnerships, and Senator Hoar of Massachusetts suggested that the
initial language was insufficient to indicate this intent. Id. at 6832-35, 6877.
270. See Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 87 ("Ihe Senate language, ultimately adopted, seems
to rely on a natural entity theory in contrast with the House's version which fits an artificial
entity theory.") (footnote omitted).
271. The 1894 Act included the following provision:
Provided also, That in computing the income of any person, corporation,
company, or association there shall not be included the amount received from
any corporation, company, or association as dividends upon the stock of such
corporation, company, or association if the tax of two per centum has been paid
upon its net profits by said corporation, company, or association as required by
this Act.
§ 28, 28 Stat. at 554.
272. See WALKER, supra note 73, at 65-66.
273. Id. at 64.
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was based on an aggregate view of the corporationY 4 If the
corporation were truly viewed as a natural entity standing on par
with any individual, then there would be less reason to connect
the corporation's taxation with the taxation of its stockholders. 5
Thus, the integration of the corporate and shareholder income
taxes potentially points toward an aggregate conception of the
corporation.
The second feature of the legislative history that is cited in
support of an entity theory explanation is the debate over an
exemption for corporations.7 6 Individuals were taxed only on the
amount of income in excess of $4000.7 Corporations, however, were
permitted no such exemption under either the House or Senate
versions of the bill. This meant that integration of corporate-
shareholder income taxes was only partial. Corporations were
subject to the income tax even if they had income of less than $4000
per year. A shareholder's income from dividends was indirectly
subject to a tax even if the shareholder's income was otherwise
below the exemption amount and, therefore, normally nontaxable.' 8
Commentators have scrutinized the debates over the lack of a
corporate exemption because of the entity theory undertonesY 9 The
argument in favor of an exemption was itself based on a partnership
theory of the corporation. As one exemption proponent explained,
274. See id. Walker indicated:
The circumstances ... are really the same, in this respect, as that of a private
partnership. No one would assert that a partnership should be taxed on its
property in the name of the firm, and that each partner should also be liable
individually for what he has already paid taxes on, jointly with his associates.
Id.
275. Such a connection would likely be made on alternative grounds, such as the efficiency-
related concern of subjecting corporate and noncorporate income to the same tax burden.
276. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTs, supra note 9, at 38; Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 88.
277. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
278. See 26 CONG. REc. 6865 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hill) (explaining that if an
individual makes a $3000 profit from a $5000 investment in a partnership, "that profit of
$3,000 is not taxed, as the individual is entitled to an exemption of $4,000, but if I place that
$5,000 as an investment in a corporation, before a dividend comes to me from that corporation
the tax is already taken out in advance").
279. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 88. This view may be buttressed, in part, by the
lack of entity theory undertones in a similar debate over a corporate exemption in the 1864
Act. See LANGENDERFER, supra note 24, at 508-09 (describing debate over a proposal to permit
shareholders with annual incomes below $1000 to receive a refund for amounts withheld from
dividends).
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"corporations are but aggregations of the capital of individuals for
joint profit, with joint liability and joint loss, conveniently divided
into shares for the purposes of distribution and management."' 0
Another proponent echoed this sentiment, pointing out that "[a]
corporation is simply an aggregation of individuals. Many of the
corporations that have been chartered under the various State
governments are simply coaperative associations." 2s Given this
shareholder-centered view of the corporation, the natural question
was "why levy this tax upon this class of citizens having income less
than $4,000 who happen to be shareholders in corporations?"s 2
Senator George Graham Vest of Missouri, the principal draftsman
of the corporate income tax provision and the spokesman for the
Senate Finance Committee on the issue,2 s defended the lack of an
exemption by explaining:
We do not deal with the stockholders. We deal with a
corporation as a legal being, doing business, artificially created,
receiving protection upon its property from the General
Government like citizens receive protection upon theirs. If it
consumed clothing and food and paid the internal-revenue tax
and the tariff import tax as does the individual, then the
exemption should apply.'
280. 26 CONG. Rsc. 6874 (1894) (statement of Sen. Higgins).
281. Id. at 6876 (statement of Sen. Aldrich).
282. I& at 6874 (statement of Sen. Higgins); see also id. at 6868 (statement of Sen. Allison)
( What is the proposition as to taxing these corporations? They are entities in one sense, but
they are composed of individuals who own the shares, and who would be taxed on these shares
without [the proposed exemption], and who are now exempted if their income exceeds
$4,000.').
283. See MANUEL IRWIN KUHR, THE SPEAKING CAREER OF GEORGE GRAHAM VEST 313-14
(1963) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri) (on file with author).
284. 26 CONG. REc. 6866 (1894) (statement of Sen. Vest). Senator Vest went on to explain:
My argument this morning was to show that we treated a corporation as a legal
entity, that we had nothing to do with stockholders, that we treated corporations
exactly as we treated individuals, except that we give them no exemptions ....
Senators talk to me now about the stockholder being different from a
corporation. We know nothing about the stockholder. We deal with the
corporation as an entity, and that is the whole of the argument, whether good
or bad.
Id- at 6879. Earlier, Senator Vest addressed the consumption argument by stating.
[Ilt was assumed in the House of Representatives, and we adopt now the same
exemption, that the consumption of a man, say, with six or seven in his family
in the course of the year will amount to about the sum which we have exempted.
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This suggested that the majority viewed the corporation as a
separate entity but found no justification for providing it with relief
from the full measure of taxation. Given that this latter argument
ultimately carried the day, modem observers have concluded that
legislators not only were aware that the 1894 Act for the first time
targeted corporations directly, but also were motivated to do so
because of the ascendancy of the natural entity theory.2"
Such a conclusion gives too much weight to the debates and the
exemption issue itself. The shape of the income tax bill "was
determined by caucus debate, committee conference, and private
conversation. ... [Plublic debate had little influence, and even
lengthy speaking for the record was superfluous.""' The bill's
sponsors clearly had little interest in extending the debate." As a
consequence, the rationales offered hardly provided solid evidence
of their theory of the corporation or their rationale for the corporate
tax. Some arguments, such as the fact that the exemption was
provided to individuals to offset the consumption taxes that a
corporation did not have to pay,288 could be construed as supporting
a natural entity theory view of the corporation. Other arguments,
however, such as the fact that corporations received privileges
unavailable to individuals, 9 were based on a grant or concession
Does that rule apply to corporations? Does the corporation eat anything?. Does
it drink anything?.
Id at 6866.
285. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 36-39.
286. KUHR, supra note 283, at 309; see also 26 CONG. REC. 6882 (1894) (statement of Sen.
Hoar) (accusing the Democrats of putting "voting in the Senate into a trust, which has two or
three managers").
287. See Kuhr, supra note 283, at 310 ("It was the intention of the Democrats to speed the
bill along by refraining from debate, except for concise explanations of their changes....").
288. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6867 (1894) (statement of Sen. Vest) ("We are told now that
libertylies bleedingin the streets unless this exemption of $4,000, amounting to a tax of $80
a year, is given to corporations, who eat nothing, drink nothing, [and) buy no clothes...."); id.
at 6868 (statement of Sen. Vest) ("I believe the bill is right as it is now, and that the
corporations ought to be made to pay, as they pay no tax upon consumption, without the
exemptions.").
289. Representative McMillan summarized the concession theory, stating.
The corporation pays upon all its net income. And why?. We will give you our
reasons for it. Here are artificial parties; here are creatures of the law that have
peculiar privileges. They have in some instances the right of eminent domain;
they have the right to sue and be sued as individuals.... They have the right to
be exempt from personal liability. As the Government has to keep its courts in
existence for the benefit of many of these corporations, as all or a majority of
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theory that supposedly lost its force amidst the spread of general
incorporation statutes. 290 Still other arguments, such as the
difficulty of administering a more broadly applicable individual
exemption,2 1 were unrelated to the entity theory rationale. Not
surprisingly, the spokesmen for the Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means committees ultimately hid behind the decision of
their respective committees when their arguments proved unper-
suasive.'
Perhaps more revealing than the debate was the Senate vote on
two of the most promising, and seriously considered, of the various
amendments introduced in an attempt to resolve the exemption
issue.293 One proposed amendment provided a $4000 exemption for
corporations and the other exempted from the corporate tax the
share of dividends owed to individuals with total incomes below the
them are presumed to be founded upon surplus, we have thought that an
exception might be made in their case, and that the exemption need not apply,
therefore, the net income of the corporation would be liable.
26 CONG. REC. 420 (1894) (statement of Rep. McMillin).
290. Moreover, the bills opponents were quick to discount these privilege arguments on the
grounds that it was the state, rather than the federal government, that provided the privilege
in the first place. Tunell, supra note 60, at 335 n.2.
291. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REC. 6867 (1894) (statement of Sen. Vest) (commenting on an
amendment that would allow corporations to deduct each shareholder's dividends from their
income to the extent they did not exceed the $4000 exemption amount when combined with
all of the shareholder's other sources of income).
292. Representative McMillin relied upon the committee's decision when he stated:
[If the committee should conclude that injustice has been done here it can be
remedied. We have given the subject the best thought we could and have
concluded that that was right. If on the contrary there should be an exemption
in favor of a corporation, as of an individual, you can make it by applying the
exemption to the corporation as well as the individual. That will be for the
Committee of the Whole to determine when they come to consider the bill by
sections.
26 CONG. REC. 420 (1894) (statement of Rep. McMillin). Senator Vest also sought refuge in
the committee:
I am here as the organ of the committee. I have no personal discretion in the matter.
all this matter can be adjusted in conference. It does not facilitate the passage of the bill
to accept any amendment because the amendments seem to increase and feed upon what
is given.
Id. at 6883 (statement of Sen. Vest)
293. Several less serious amendments were offered but they were defeated fairly handily,
in part because they were awkwardly worded or difficult to administer. See id at 6867
(discussing a variant on the $4000 exemption); id. at 6868 (exempting all corporations with
a capital of less than $100,000 from the tax altogether); id. at 6875 (discussing a $3000
exemption); i- at 6878 (discussing a $1000 exemption).
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$4000 exemption.294 The former appeared to support an entity
view and the latter appeared to support an aggregate view of the
corporation. Despite such stark contrast in their apparent theo-
retical underpinnings, both amendments were defeated by relatively
slim margins. The corporate exemption amendment was defeated by
a 30-to-28 vote while the individual exemption amendment, despite
its well-discussed administrative difficulties, 5 was defeated by a
31-to-24 vote.2 96 This suggests the exemption issue was both less
significant and closer to resolution than others have implied.
The exemption issue was thought to be of low significance because
few honestly believed that many taxpayers would suffer from the
failure to track the exemption to cover corporate profits. Taxpayers
with income below $4000 were unlikely to hold much stock in
corporations. As one senator exclaimed, "there is a good deal of
nonsense" in the notion that the "poor people of the country" own
the railroads and banks. 7 At the same time, the exemption
294. The provision was explained to mean'that:
The amount of any dividends paid to a single stockholder not exceeding $4,000
annually may be deducted by corporations, companies, or associations, not
including partnerships, from any amounts upon which they would otherwise be
compelled to pay, the tax herein provided for; but the amount of such dividends
so received by such single stockholder shall be included in estimating any
income he may have in excess of $4,000, and in that event it shall bear its
proportion of the tax herein provided for.
26 CONG. REc. 6867 (1894); id- at 6883 ("[Tlhere shall be levied and collected, except as herein
otherwise provided, a tax of 2 per cent annually on the net profits or income above $4,000 and
above actual operating and business expenses.").
295. One senator voiced several concerns and asked:
How is the corporation to settle with each individual stockholder in making up
its net profits for the year? It does its business as an entirety. It makes so much
money or it loses so much money. It is to pay the tax upon its net profits. Now,
if that amendment should be adopted it would be requisite for the corporation,
before it ascertains what its net profits are, to set aside certain amounts of
money, not to be taken any account of in its business at all. How is this to be
done?
Id. at 6867-68 (statement of Sen. Vest).
296. ld. at 6882 (reporting the defeat of the individual exemption amendment); id. at 6883
(reporting the defeat of the corporate exemption amendment).
297. Id. at 6869 (statement of Sen. Teller). Similar statements were made in the House.
Representative John Sharp Williams, a staunch defender of the income tax bill, protested that
everyone knows "that it is not the widows and orphans of this country who own the banks and
railroad companies and the insurance companies of the United States. There may be some
widows and orphans who have such investments, but they are widows and orphans of large
estates." Id. at 1739 (statement of Rep. Williams).
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amendment was close to passage because some of the Republican
and other minority party senators who voted in favor of keeping the
income tax also voted for one or both exemption amendments.298
After extensive caucus debate, the Democrats, with one exception,29
agreed to vote in a block on all issues related to the income tax.300
Their failure to support an exemption, therefore, was probably more
the result of party loyalty than a tacit acceptance of any of the
entity-theory principles expressed during the debates.
Ultimately, the flaw in the entity-theory explanation, and its
variants,30' is one of perspective. By focusing on the 1894 Act to
discern the influence of entity theory on the origins of the corporate
income tax, commentators have obscured the role played by the
taxation of corporations on both the state and federal level from the
Civil War through the 1890s. This history, as much as the
Some senators may have also believed that the Internal Revenue Service would in practice
alleviate the "injustice" in their collections from individuals. During the Civil War and
Reconstruction, the Service directed its collectors to obtain the extra amount due from
shareholders whose income tax rates exceeded the tax imposed on corporations. See supra text
accompanying note 26. The difference under the 1894 Act, however, was that the Service
would have had to provide a refundto remedy the injustice, a practice not likely to be initiated
without express authorization.
298. Senators voting to keep the income tax and to pass both exemption amendments were
John Mitchell (R. Or.) and Thomas Power (R. Mont.). Senators voting to keep the income tax
and the corporate exemption only included James Kyle (Ind. S.D.), William Peffer (Pop.
Kans.), and Henry Teller (R. Colo.). Compare 26 CONG. REC. 6882-83 (1894) (corporate and
individual exemption votes), with 26 CONG. REc. 6934 (1894) (income tax vote). See also
BIOGRAPHICAL DiRECTORY OF THE AMEIuCAN CONGRESS 1774-1971, at 254-58 (1971) (party
affiliations).
299. Senator David Hill of New York was the lone Democrat dissenter on the income tax.
KUHE, supra note 283, at 311.
300. Id.
301. One possible alternative explanation is that corporations were considered artificial
entities in 1864 and natural entities in 1894. Cf Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 85-86
(discussing the Court's simultaneous recognition of the corporation as a separate entity and
permission to tax a corporation's undivided profits in Collector v. Hubbard). In the former
case, the corporation would be an entity only for certain state purposes, and not for purposes
of federal taxation. In the latter case, the corporation would be treated on par with the
individual for federal tax purposes. Notwithstanding that the corporation was taxed on par
with individuals during the height of the grant/concession period in the beginning of the
nineteenth century, see supra text accompanying notes 124-49, even Kornhauser concedes
that both the House version, which evidenced an artificial entity approach, and the Senate
version, which evidenced a natural entity approach, supported the direct, rather than the
pass-through taxation of the corporation. Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 87.
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legislative history of the 1894 Act itself, sheds significant light on
the true nature of the original corporate income tax.
III. A SHAREHOLDER-CENTERED EXPLANATION FOR THE
CORPORATE INCoME TAx
One of the principal problems with the traditional explanation for
Congress' change in approach is that it assumes the 1894 Act's
corporate income tax was actually a radical departure from the Civil
War tax. It is true that both the House and Senate bills in 1894
changed several features in the 1864 Act's scheme for the taxation
of corporate income. For instance, the 1894 House bill applied the
tax to corporations rather than certain industries and made a
dividend tax coupled with a corporate undistributed profits tax its
centerpiece, thus abandoning the 1864 Act's tax on shareholders'
undivided profits. The 1894 Senate bill discarded the dividend tax
used in both the 1864 Act and the House bill in favor of a corporate
income tax. The following examination of each of these changes and
the underlying history suggests, however, that the 1894 Act's
taxation of corporate income is a great deal closer to the 1864 Act's
approach than most observers assert. In both cases, Congress
sought to tax the investor. The only difference was that by 1894
Congress recognized the benefits of distinguishing between the
corporation and the partnership in taxing increasingly elusive
intangible wealth.
A. The Increasing Focus on Corporate Wealth
The first apparent change was to add a general tax on
corporations. In the 1864 Act, Congress imposed a tax on
businesses, but it appeared to target certain industries rather than
forms of organization. In addition to defining "income" to include
the undivided "gains and profits of all companies, whether in-
corporated or partnership," °" Congress imposed a five percent tax
on all dividends and undistributed sums of companies in the
transportation, banking, and insurance industries.30 3 In contrast,
302. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282.
303. Id. § 120-22.
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the 1894 House bill proposed a two percent tax on the dividends and
undistributed sums of "corporations or associations organized for
profit by virtue of the laws of the United States or of any State or
Territory, by means of which the liability of the individual
stockholders is in anywise limited."s°4
Modern observers, in declaring that "[the 1894 Act ... marked
the first time in this country's revenue history that the law
distinguished corporations from other types of business organi-
zations for tax purposes," imply that the 1894 Act was a radical shift
in approach. 30 5 This conclusion, however, is based on a limited
review of federal rather than state revenue law. The growth of
intangible wealth during the latter half of the nineteenth century
led states to direct their attention to the sources of such wealth,
which in turn led taxing authorities to enact statutes directed, first,
at certain industries and, eventually, at corporations in general.
Viewed in this light, the shift from the 1864 Act to the 1894 Act was
a much more gradual process than commonly has been assumed and
the similarities between the two Acts more striking.
1. Property Taxation and "New" Wealth
One corollary of the dramatic increase in the number and size of
corporations in the latter half of the nineteenth century was a
dramatic increase in the country's intangible wealth. Prior to the
Civil War, most of the country's wealth was in tangible form-real
property or personalty, such as the harvest reaped from an
individual's farm-and thus could be easily identified." s This
situation, however, quickly changed. Within two decades after the
end of the Civil War, "the bulk of Northern property had assumed
new shapes: machinery, credits, securities, mortgages, savings,
exchange values, 'going-concerns,' and personal possessions. If much
of this wealth was tangible, just as the 'old wealth' had been, much
more of it was intangible, hard to locate, hard to value." 07
304. 26 CONG. REc. 6831 (1894).
305. Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U.
L. REV. 437,438 (1995).
306. See YEALEY, supra note 252, at 39.
807. Id.; see also RICHARD T. ELY, TAXATION IN AMERrc STATES AND CITIES 143 (1888)
(estimating that the value of all personal property in the country was at least equal to and
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The increase in the value of intangible property was primarily
attributable to the growth of the corporation. 08 While some
intangible wealth surely was held in partnership form, corporate
investments accounted for the vast majority of such wealth. As one
state tax commission concluded, "[t]he wealth of the country in
personalty consists largely of investments in corporate securities,
stocks, and bonds in railroad and other corporations."" 9 Perhaps
most importantly, contemporary legislatures believed that the "new"
wealth was primarily corporate. As Clifton Yearley explained:
By the end of the last century, land was believed much less
valuable than formerly and despite the possibilities of raised
assessments, it appeared to be a shrinking reservoir from which
to siphon taxes. On the other hand, corporate wealth was taken
to be prodigiously valuable, more than anyone had ever
dreamed.s0
The new wealth posed considerable difficulties for existing state
and local property tax systems. Because of the real property
orientation of the prevailing tax systems, holders of intangible
property were accused of not bearing their fair share of the
burden.3 ' In 1860, the president of the American Statistical
Association noted that there is "a very prevalent opinion that some
perhaps as much as double the value of all real property based on figures for England in
1869).
308. See Seligman, supra note 138, at 269 ("In all ages and in all countries it has been
found almost impossible to reach intangible personalty. What has always been a difficult task
has become immensely complicated to-day through the growth of the modem corporation.").
309. Roswell C. McCrea, A Suggestion on the Taxation of Corporations, 19 Q. J. ECON. 492,
493 n.1 (1905) (quoting REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN STATE TAX COMMSSION (1903)).
310. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 197.
311. As one report of the period put it:
Tihe profits of large numbers of the citizens of the State who have moneyed and
business operations are untaxed. The citizen who buys and sells real
estate-who deals in stocks and securities-who speculates in grain or the
necessities of life, is not called upon to contribute one penny for the support of
the government.
Report of John A. Wright, in REPORT OF THE REVENUE COMMISSION APPOINTED BYTHE ACT OF
THE LEGISLATURE OF PENNSYLVANIA, MAY 25, 1889, 38, 128 (1890); see also Sumner Benson,
A History of the General Property Tax, in GEORGE C. S. BENSON ET AL., THE AMERICAN
PROPERTY TAXm ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 52 (1965); ELY, supra
note 307, at 140 ("Some way must be contrived to make owners of these new kinds of property,
who include most of our wealthiest citizens, pay their due share of taxes.").
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of the more wealthy citizens, much of whose property is invisible ...
do not bear their due proportion of the public burdens. ... [While, at
the same timeJ real estate ... cannot escape the observation of
public officers, and these are fully taxed.""' State legislatures,
dominated by farmers eager to equalize the burden,"'3 aggressively
instituted commissions to study the problem and enacted statutes
designed to reach intangible property. 1 4
The problem was that the general property tax was ill-suited to
the task of collecting on wealth that could not be seen or touched. 15
As Professor Henry Carter Adams reported at the time, "[tihe
development of the corporation and the increase of incorporeal
property which comes with the increase of interdependence in
industrial matters have destroyed the conditions under which a
general property tax can work in a satisfactory manner."3 16 Tax
evasion was rampant because individuals were trusted with the
responsibility of reporting the value of their assets and collectors
were forced to rely on mere "conjecture."17 In New York City, for
312. Edward Jarvis, On the System of Taxation prevailing in the United States, and
especially in Massachusetts, 23 J. STAT. SOC'Y OF LONDON 370, 376 (1860).
313. ELY, supra note 307, at 144; YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 39-41. Yearley, quoting from
an 1881 article in The Nation, noted that, "[a] few farmers themselves acknowledged that 'it
was entirely by their vote that the existing system [was] ... maintained,' thanks to a'political
influence vastly out of proportion to their numbers' and a burning 'hope of getting at the rich
bondholders and goldhugs somehow. Id. at 41 (brackets and ellipses in original).
314. See, e.g., CADMAN, supra note 176, at 404 ("In recognition of the increasingimportance
of intangible wealth, an amendment to the [New Jersey] general tax law was passed in 1851
for the purpose of reaching the owners of intangible property."); Report of John A. Wright,
supra note 311, at 123 ("The great increase in the value of personal property since that date
[1861] has been an incentive to Legislatures to tax capital in the various forms in which it is
represented in personal property. All the States have endeavored to reach personal property,
and this has been eminently true" of Pennsylvania.).
315. See ELY, supra note 307, at 141 ("The existing method of assessing and taxing
property was better adapted to the first half of the nineteenth century than to the second half,
because taxation was less important, and also because property could more readily be
found."); FRIEDMAN, supra note 212, at 28 ("It was progressively more difficult under the
general property tax to reach much more than tangible property").
316. Henry C. Adams, Suggestions for a System of Taxation, in PUBLiCATIONS MICH. POL.
Sci. ASSN 49, 55 (May 1894); see also CLAPPERTON, supra note 214, at 8 ("The inadequacy,
under existing economic conditions, of the general property tax, so called, and its utter failure,
even under the most rigorous and effective administrative methods that have been devised,
to reach for taxation property of a corporate and intangible character, are recognized in all
the States named.").
317. Jarvis, supra note 312, at 375. Part of the evasion may also have been attributable to
a sort of race-to-the-bottom among elected tax assessors seeking to curry favor with their
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instance, only 8900 individuals out of a total population of one
million in 1875 conceded liability for personal property despite
conservative estimates that set the total value of all such property
at two billion dollars."' A report from the Ohio Tax Commission
commented that "fully one-half of the property of a modem State
exists in intangible forms: of this all but a mere bagatelle escapes
taxation entirely, when the attempt is made to reach it in the form
of property."1 9 Perhaps the most revealing statistic is that from
1860 to 1880, a period in which the assessed valuation of real estate
grew from just under $7 million to just over $13 million, the
assessed value of personal property declined by more than $1.2
million. 20 Few believed the decline was attributable to an actual
drop in asset value.321
2. Tax Evasion and Anticorporate Sentiment
Although tax evasion involving intangible assets was widespread
across different classes of taxpayers and categories of property,
corporate shareholders were foremost on every legislator's "Most
Wanted" list for such abuse. Investors often either failed to list
corporate securities among their assets, or, if listed, the value of
such securities was seriously understated. The latter problem may
have been due to the difficulty of arriving at an accurate value in
the absence of public markets,322 but tax evasion was rampant even
citizenry and produce the lowest possible tax burden relative to other areas of the state. See
QUINCY, supra note 72, at 6 ("The Confederate Treasury became the greatest money factory
in the world."); Adams, supra note 316, at 55-56 (same).
318. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 42-43.
319. Charles F. Dunbar, The New Income Tax, 9 Q. J. EcON. 26, 35-36 (1895) (quoting
REPORT OF THE TAX COMMISSION OF OMO OF 1893, at 42).
320. Adams, supra note 316, at 56 (citation omitted).
321. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 311, at 53 (noting that "the absolute decline in personal
property assessment and the relative decline in the role of personal property were clear signs
that assessment practice did not reflect changes in the national economy" and concluding that
"[cilearly, many citizens, when faced with a tax list on which they were to report all their
personal property, simply did not display the same spirit of idealism that had prompted the
adoption of general property tax requirements"); James A. Briggs, Letter to the Editor,
Taxation and Assessment in the State of New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1882, at 2 ("There
is no doubt that there has been a very large increase of taxable personal property in this State
since 1858. And yet there has been a large decrease in the assessed valuations .... ").
322. A Newark Daily Advertiser editorial commented that the value "of personals is so
doubtful that their owner rarely knows with any exactness how much he is worth, and he has
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when the securities were publicly traded. In California, for instance$
the total value of all taxable securities quoted on the San Francisco
Exchange was in excess of $110 million, but less than $8.5 million
of that value was reported on tax returns.323 This pattern of
underreporting was also evident in Pennsylvania, where the state
tax commission admitted that the amount of tax received from
personal property was "far below the holdings of bonds and stocks
by citizens of the State."3s Ultimately, Professor Adams concluded,
"[wihen one observes the character of [stocks and bonds] and the
ease with which [their value] is concealed, it is clear that an attempt
to apply the theory of the general property tax to corporations must
result in the evasion of taxation by a considerable portion of this
property."325
In states where the tax primarily targeted the source of corporate
wealth rather than the investor, the corporation was accused of not
paying its fair share.326 In part, this was less a matter of tax evasion
than the product of the generous tax exemptions provided under
federal, state, and local law. 27 Cynical observers, however, saw little
difference between these exemptions and outright tax fraud.
Corporations had merely cloaked their fraud in the color of law by
purchasing such exemptions from corrupt legislators .3' The general
view, expressed by one editorialist, was that the corporation "pays
for its law by the year" and thereby has "succeeded very largely in
shaping legislation to suit their purposes."329 It did not take a wild-
eyed radical to see that "[1legislatures had been bought like cattle
an excuse in that for underestimate." Editorial, Taxes on Corporations, NEWARK DAILY
ADVERTisER, Feb. 18, 1870, at 1.
323. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 58.
324. Report of John A. Wright, supra note 311, at 132.
325. HENRY CARTER ADAMS, THE SCIENCE OF FINANcE: AN INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC
EXPENDrrURES AND PUBLIC REVENUES 382 (1898).
326. See YEARLEY, supra note 252, at59 ("Itwas a popularprejudice that corporations were
guilty of extensive evasion, a prejudice all the more bitter to those who entertained it because
of the fiscal advantages which they realized governments had extended these businesses.").
327. Id. In 1882, newspaper headlines cried foul at a provision that would exempt elevated
railroad corporations from certain taxes. See, eg., Trying to Evade Taxes-The Elevated
Railroads Endeavoring to Cheat the City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1882, at 2.
328. See JAMES H. COLEMAN, LETTERS &C. ON CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION 2 (n.d.)
(approx. 1880) (citing correspondence of the New York Daily Graphic, Dec. 23, 1878).
329. Editorial, Corporate Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1882, at 6.
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and sheep, though hardly for so little money."33 1 Perhaps recognizing
the truth of these charges, states sought to insulate themselves from
temptation. Pennsylvania, for example, enacted a constitutional
provision barring the legislature from ever surrendering its right to
tax corporations." I Although some of these legislatively bestowed
tax advantages were counterbalanced by the inefficiencies of local
property tax administration, 2 they nevertheless provided support
for charges that corporate wealth failed to bear its fair share of the
tax burden.
Further fueling popular prejudice against the corporation was the
fact that corporations appeared to engage in more than their fair
share of actual tax evasion.31 In one well-reported example,
Cornelius Vanderbilt's New York Central Railroad, which claimed
in its financial documents to have capital of $143 million, paid taxes
on only $22 million of it by double deducting its indebtedness."4 In
another case, the Western Union Telegraph Company, claiming that
its wires and telegraph poles were not taxable as real estate, paid
taxes on a capital of $1.8 million despite distributing dividends on
a capital of $47 million." These were hardly isolated examples.
"[C]rooked accounts, dishonest bonding, under-assessment, phony
330. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 61 (paraphrasing Rev. Henry Ward Beecher).
331. JOHN F. WHrrWoRTH, TAXATION OF FOREIGN AND DOMSTIC CORPORATIONS, JOINT
STOCK ASSOCIATIONS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN PENNSYLVANIA 53 (1901).
332. See YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 80 ("Corporate properties ... were frequently
victimized or faced with victimization by inequities in the operations of the general property
tax. Advantages won by particular corporations from governments, or awarded to them by
governments, were sometimes heavily counterbalanced by inequities.").
One author of the time described the imperfections as follows:
The multiplicity and lack of homogeneity of existing systems of taxation are the
causes of their greatest imperfections; and this lack of homogeneity and the
conflicts resulting therefrom especially affect corporations, of which many large
ones, both private and public, ramify through several States, holding property
and doing business in each, and thus becoming subject to the tax laws of each.
Edward C. Moore, Jr., Corporate Taxation, 18 AM. L. REv. 750, 752 (1884). As Yearley
explains, such inequities "might suggest nuances in the usual picture of corporate offenders
against society, or might at least provide another explanation of why some were driven to
offenses." YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 80-81.
333. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 60-61.
334. Id at 62; COLEMAN, supra note 328, at 7. The railroad, apparently in violation of New
York judicial decisions barring the practice, treated debt as diminishing the value of its
capital stock and then deducted the debt from the already diminished valuations. YEARLEY,
supra note 252, at 62.
335. COLEMAN, supra note 328, at 9.
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indebtedness, the juggling of domiciles, collusion with public
officials, or bribing them were all part of the arsenal of corporate tax
dodgers."33 Because of the high-profile nature of the corporation and
its abuses, it is perhaps not surprising that one commentator
reported in 1884 that "there is a wide-spread feeling that corporate
bodies are natural enemies of the people."3 7 It became popular to
call on state legislatures to collect all of their revenues from
corporations.38
3. State Targeting of Corporations for Special Taxation
The combination of this anticorporate sentiment and the failings
of the general property tax led state after state to search for
alternative methods of taxing the corporation.339 The first method
chosen-and the one reflected in the 1864 Act-was targeting
corporation-dominated industries imposing taxes designed to reach
wealth missed by the general property tax. 4 Thus, states enacted
taxes narrowly tailored to reach the assets of banks, insurance
companies, railroads, and other transportation and transmission
336. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 63.
337. Moore, supra note 332, at 751; see also Current Events-The Growth of Corporate
Organization, 20 CENT. L.J. 481,482 (1885) ("[IThe prejudice against corporations has become
so violent that the name corporation has almost become synonymous with monopoly.").
338. See, e.g., Bolton Hall, Essay 1, in EQUITABLE TAXATION 58 (1892) (describing the
governor of New York's expression of hope that all expenses could be met through the taxation
ofcorporations); YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 60 ('Demagogues,'insisted E.L. Godkin in 1879,
'are constantly bringing forward schemes to relieve the whole people from public burdens by
taxing corporations.'); Adams, supra note 316, at 58-59 ("[IThe chief source of revenue to the
states should be from the corporation tax... [Because] the states do not expend more than
$140,000,000 annually, their demands could be easily met by a corporation tax.").
339. See ADAMS, supra note 325, at 382 ("In order to overcome this difficulty [tax evasion],
as also to evade the theoretic criticisms as applied to personal property, there is an observed
tendency in recent revenue reforms toward the development of special methods of taxing
corporate property."); YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 197 ("Legislation by the states to exploit
corporate wealth as a major source of public revenue, though little publicized, represented one
of the chief reform efforts of the last third of the nineteenth century."); Adams, supra note 316,
at 57 ("It was in recognition of the fact that the general property tax worked a great injustice
that legislators have in recent years attempted to supplement it by the corporation tax.").
340. See SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 143; see also FRANK I. HERRIOr, AN INTRODUCTION
To THE HISTORY OF CORPORATION TAXES IN IOWA 4a (1902) (noting that initially, "[olne class
of corporations would receive attention and then another. One method of assessment would
be taken with one class and another basis with another class."). This classification movement
extended beyond corporations, covering all forms of tangible and intangible property. See
Benson, supra note 311, at 63.
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companies. 34 The taxes generally targeted capital stock, surplus,
franchise, gross receipts, dividends, or net profits, or some com-
bination of the above, depending upon the characteristics of the
individual industry.3" This special system of corporate taxation was
primarily justified on the ground that there were "certain classes of
corporations which, from their nature, could not conform to general
laws." 43 As one contemporary commentator observed, the general
property tax's "complete failure" to reach companies in the banking,
Pullman car, telephone, telegraph and insurance industries, among
others, resulted in "the adoption of separate and distinct systems for
their taxation."3 " By contrast, corporations in other industries were
not subject to special taxation because conventional methods were
relatively more successful."
The problem with this industry-specific system of corporate
taxation was that corporations soon began to dominate virtually all
341. SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 143-66 (discussing various attempts to target each
industry with something other than the general property tax). In New Jersey, for example,
there were:
[C]ertain types of business corporations that were singled out during the first
half of the nineteenth century for special treatment in the matter of taxation.
The principal representatives of the groups to which special rules of taxation
were applied were commercial banks, insurance companies, canal and railroad
corporations, and a few early telegraph companies.
CADMAN, supra note 176, at 389. Not surprisingly, the majority of businesses incorporated
during this period were operating in one of these industries. See HURST, supra note 105, at
17 (listing percentages of second charters given for these business types).
342. HURST, supra note 105, at 17; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 212, at 28-32 (describing
Massachusetts' tax on savings banks as an excise on the privilege of operating in corporate
form).
343. Moore, supra note 332, at 754.
344. Walter E. Weyl, in EQUITABLETAXATION 21(1892) (Weyl, anineteen-yearold Wharton
student, was the first prize winner in an 1891 essay contest sponsored by the journal Public
Opinion whose prize-winning essays were reprinted in this volume.). An 1893 report of the
Ohio Tax Commission, in advocating a franchise tax based upon gross receipts, elaborated on
the problems of taxing specific industries under the general property tax:
An express company may own nothing within the State beyond a few horses and
wagons and trucks; a telephone company or telegraph company owns a few miles
of wire, which is worthless except as a source of revenue, and a number of
instruments of small value ... It is apparent that in all of these cases the
property owned is no index whatever of the ability to aid in bearing the burdens
of the State.
WALKER, supra note 73, at 73 n.1 (quoting OHIO TAX COMMISSION 48, 60 (1893)).
345. See ADAMS, supra note 325, at 449-50.
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industries." The taxation of corporations in some industries, but
not in others, became increasingly untenable.' In effect, the
industry-based exception was swallowing the general rule that
corporations should be treated the same as individuals for tax
purposes. Thus, states increasingly shifted their focus from taxation
of industries to taxation of corporations."' Industry-specific taxes
were not eliminated; instead, they were supplemented with a
general system of corporate taxation intended to more fairly allocate
the burden of taxation. In 1869, New Jersey's Governor used his
inaugural address to call for the adoption of a tax "based on the
'profits or dividends' of all the corporations chartered" by the
state. 49 According to the Governor, only a few corporations, and
some of them neither rich nor profitable, contributed all of the
expenses of the state.'0 The corporate tax was designed "to include
all, or at least many more corporations in the operation of the
law, thus increasing the sources of revenue and equalizing the
burdens."35' Although New Jersey's general corporate tax
subsequently died for lack of enforcement, 2 other states were
motivated by similar concerns. Both Massachusetts' general
corporate tax, enacted in 1864 and New York's general corporate
tax, enacted in 1880, were taxes on all corporate franchises except
346. See Adams, supra 316, at 65 (statement of Mr. Cutcheon during discussion of Adams'
paper).
347. See YEAELEY, supra note 252, at 209-10 (citing the example of Pennsylvania's failure
to tax corporations in a new type of industry-the building and loan association-simply
because of the practice of naming the industries to which the tax applied and thereby
exempting all other industries to arise after the adoption of the statute).
348. The pattern for taxing industries rather than corporations has been described as
follows:
By 1903 ... seventeen of the twenty states of the iron rectangle reached the
capital stock of corporations under provisions of the general property tax as
specially administered for certain classes of corporations. Under special
definitions ofpersonal property, moreover, eight of the twenty states, including
New York, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois levied taxation on corporate
franchises. But the most impressive shift away from the policies of the preceding
generation could be traced in the fact that seventeen states of the Northern tier
had inaugurated extensive systems of distinct corporate taxation, some general,
some special.
Id. at 207.
349. CADMAN, supra note 176, at 409-10.
350. Editorial, Taxes on Corporations, NEWARJK DAILYADVERTisER, Feb. 18, 1870, at 1.
351. I&
352. CADMAN, supra note 176, at 414. Itwas eventually revived in the 1880s. Id. at 415-16.
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those in industries governed by other provisions. 3 Similarly, a
special revenue commission in Iowa recommended to the
Legislature in 1893 that, in addition to reforming its taxation of
corporations in specific industries, it adopt a general corporation tax
for "ordinary business corporations."" 4 The corporation tax became
not merely a Band-Aid to cover the gaps in the traditional property
tax's reach, but a separate form of taxation altogether.
Paralleling the advent of the general corporation tax was a
growing recognition of the failings of property-based systems of
corporate taxation such as the tax on a corporation's capital stock.
The problem was that a corporation's capital stock was not very
reliably correlated with its ability to pay. Where the tax was based
on the amount of capital stock outstanding at the time of
incorporation, corporations could easily reduce their burden by
deliberately establishing a low capitalization. In one typical
example, an Indiana railroad whose stock was worth at least $3
million set its capital stock at a mere $50,000 because state law
imposed a tax based on a percentage of the capital stock at the time
of incorporation. 55 As a local commentator noted in discussing the
situation, "[tihe law as framed admits of evasions .... but how can
such a result be avoided under the law? You can not compel a
corporation to have a certain amount of capital stock." ss Moreover,
capital stock was a measure of equity, rather than debt,
contributions to the corporation. Thus, as Edwin Seligman pointed
out, a "heavily bonded corporation would ... entirely escape
taxation; because in such cases-and they are the great
majority-the capital stock alone would not represent the value of
the property."357 Because of such problems, states increasingly
resorted to corporate taxes based upon earnings, business
transacted, dividends, and profits or income.' The trend was away
353. Seligman, supra note 138, at 301-02.
354. HERRIOTr, supra note 340, at 24. Critics opposed the then-novel method of taxing
corporations on the market value of their capital stock. Id at 26. The recommendation was
eventually adopted in 1897. Id.
355. JACOB P. DUNN, THE NEW TAX LAW OF INDIANA AND THE SCIENCE OF TAXATION 51
(1892).
356. Id.
357. SELIGAN, supra note 125, at 193.
358. Seligman, supra note 138, at 271-73.
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from taxation of corporate property and toward the taxation of
corporate income.
The corporate income tax, therefore, arose in part because of the
traditional property tax's failure to reach intangible wealth. In
effect, it was a substitute for an individual property tax on corporate
investments. Professor Adams explained that since it is "impossible
to secure payment from [stocks, bonds, shares, and other forms of
personal property] by tracing it to individual proprietors, the tax is
levied upon the corporation, which from its nature must have a legal
situs and maintain a current record of its property and earnings." 
9
Although states also might have attempted to resolve this quandary
by resorting to individual income taxation, corporate taxation
appeared to present a much more palatable alternative."o
4. Federal Taxation of Corporations
The federal experiment with a corporate tax during the
nineteenth century both was inspired by the state movement to
supplement the traditional property tax with a tax on corporations
and motivated by some of the same concerns about the taxation of
intangible wealth. Throughout the debates over taxation during the
Civil War and Reconstruction, congressional leaders expressed a
desire to shift some of the burden of taxation to the stockholders of
the country. When Thaddeus Stevens initially proposed a direct tax
on land in 1861, opponents cried they would not support a bill "that
would allow a man, a millionaire, who has put his entire property
into stock, to be exempt from taxation, while a farmer who lives by
his side must pay a tax."361 When the property tax was rejected, both
on policy and constitutional grounds,"6 2 the only existent
359. ADAMs, supra note 325, at 441-42.
360. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 226.
361. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 306 (1861) (statement ofRep. Colfax). When the
issue was revived again in 1864, opponents maintained that "you must assess taxes not upon
land alone but upon every description of property real and personal, and consequently the
owners of personal estate that amounts to such a large proportion of the aggregate wealth of
the United States ought not to be wholly exempt from the direct tax...." CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2631 (1864) (statement of Sen. Davis). The senator went on to indicate: "In
Massachusetts, and in the eastern States generally, there is a large aggregation of capital
that does not exist in the form of real estate; it exists in stocks; bank stocks, manufacturing
stocks, canal stocks, and railroad stocks, and in other forms." Id.
362. RATNEM, supra note 26, at 64-65.
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alternatives were the consumption-based tariffand excises taxes. As
one senator remarked, "I am not for any greater burden on the
consumption of this country than it bears now. I want wealth and
improper indulgences to pay the rest."" 3 Similar sentiments were
expressed during the debates over the 1894 Act. Senator Hill from
New York, while questioning the income tax's fitness for this
purpose, acknowledged that "[it is said that the wealthy men of the
country have their money so invested that they can not be reached
by other methods or systems of taxation, and that the object of the
income-tax provision is to reach that class of people."3' The
adoption of an income tax during the Civil War and in 1894,
including the taxes directed at corporate income, responded to these
concerns.
365
The industry-specific focus of the 1864 Act was a reflection of the
state trend to tax industries in which the evasion of the property tax
was the greatest. It was still, however, considered a tax on
corporations. As one senator later recounted, the "original object" of
the Civil War era dividend tax provisions
was to require the great corporations of the United States to pay
the incomes for the beneficiaries .... [I]n the sections of the
original acts and the amendments every corporation was named;
that is, the character of the corporation was named, and there
were but two kinds of corporations in our income-tax law
originally. 3
These two kinds of corporations included "moneyed corporations"
such as banks and insurance companies, and "transportation
companies."3 67 As one observer confirmed, this "legislation but
followed the approved practices of the States in selecting such a
method of reaching this form of property."3  The intent was to focus
on the industries in which the largest corporations operated and
leave shareholders in corporations where the traditional methods of
363. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2350 (1862) (statement of Sen. Simmons).
364. 26 CONG. REC. 6804(1894) (statement of Sen. Hill).
365. RATNER, supra note 26, at 67 (discussing, in particular, the adoption of an income tax
in 1861).
366. 26 CONG. REC. 6832 (1894) (statement of Sen. Allison).
367. Id
368. HOwE, supra note 202, at 103.
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taxation were adequate to be covered by the general income tax
provisions. 69
The increasing state reliance on general, rather than industry-
based, corporate taxes during the latter half of the nineteenth
century served as a model for federal government efforts during the
1890s. In fact, the House bill was effectively modeled after the
general corporation tax in Pennsylvania. As Senator Vest noted, the
House bill "adopted the system as to its details which was in the old
law of 1864 and which is found in the law of Pennsylvania to-day.370
Pennsylvania's law was the first to impose a tax on corporations
rather than industries and was the basis for later general
corporation taxes such as the one enacted in New York in 1880.3"1
Moreover, just like the trend to adopt general corporation taxes at
the state level, the 1894 House bill did not completely abandon the
previous focus on specific industries. The two percent tax was
specifically applied to banks, insurance companies, railroads and
other transportation companies, and gas, electric, and water
companies, in addition to all other corporations.7 2 Application of the
tax to corporations rather than specific industries was, therefore, a
product of the spread of the corporation to all industries. In both the
general and industry-specific taxes, the target was the corporation
rather than the partnership.
B. The Rising Popularity of Stoppage-at-the-Source Methods of
Taxation
The second difference between the 1864 Act and the 1894 House
bill is that the House bill relied exclusively on a corporate
dividends/undistributed profits tax to reach the income from
corporate investments. In the 1864 Act, Congress employed a two-
369. See 26 CONG. REc. 6832 (1894) (statement of Sen. Allison) ("All the small corporations
of the country were left to the original operation of the income tax; their dividends were paid,
if dividends were declared, and carried in the income statements and returns of the individual
members of those corporations.").
370. Id at 6866 (statement of Sen. Vest).
371. See SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 166 (stating that Pennsylvania enacted a general
corporate tax in 1840, which provided that "banks and all corporations whatever" shall be
subject to the tax); id. at 170 (describing New York's general corporation tax and noting that
it "was based on the Pennsylvania act").
372. 26 CONG. REc. 6831 (1894).
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pronged approach to the taxation of corporate income. First,
"income" was defined to include both the dividends received and an
individual's share of the undivided profits of a corporation. 73
Second, shareholders of corporations in certain specified industries
were subject to a dividends tax rather than the undivided profits
tax. Under the dividends tax, these corporations were directed to
withhold five percent of all dividends paid and remit this amount to
the government in payment of the tax due.374 All undistributed sums
or sums added to surplus or contingent funds were also subject to a
five percent tax. 75
The 1894 House bill abandoned the 1864 Act's pass-through
method of taxing corporate income, but retained the dividends
tax. As most observers acknowledged,37 the dividends tax was a
shareholder provision imposed at the corporate level to aid collection
efforts. While it is true that the corporate undistributed profits tax
was a direct tax on the corporation, it essentially served as an
enforcement mechanism for the dividends tax. If shareholders tried
to avoid taxation by causing their corporation to refrain from issuing
dividends,377 the undistributed profits tax would reach the retained
funds 8 In light of the general difficulties with enforcing previous
tax acts and the growing complexity of the corporation, it is not
surprising that the 1894 House bill dropped the pure conduit
approach and increased reliance on stoppage-at-the-source methods
373. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282.
374. Id §§ 120-122.
375. I& § 120.
376. See, eg., Hill, supra note 18, at 427 (describing the same provision in the 1862 Act:
"This tax, therefore, was essentially a part of the income tax, and was so regarded, being in
effect an assessment on the income of the stockholder or bondholder, who received his interest
or dividends diminished by the amount of the tax.").
377. Some commentators discounted this concern, usually by neglecting to take into
account the value of tax deferral. See Moore, supra note 332, at 764 (suggesting that this
phenomenon is less of a problem than it might be otherwise because of the taxation upon
eventual distribution).
378. In fact, the shareholder undivided profits provisionwas effectively designed to address
the same concern. As one scholar noted:
[lit has been contended that this tax fails to reach the profits which are not
divided but which are simply put into a reserve fund; and some commonwealths
have even sought to obviate the supposed difficulty by providing that the tax
should apply to the dividends, whether declared or merely earned and not
divided.
SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 197.
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of collection. Rather than reflecting a change in the understanding
of the corporation vis-a-vis the partnership, though, it reflected an
effort to alleviate some of the administrative burdens of the income
tax.
1. Difficulties Enforcing the Income Tax
Tax evasion was so prevalent toward the end of the nineteenth
century that it "was often perpetrated openly and defiantly."379 It
was normal for returns to be tainted by fraud on the part of the
assessors or the taxpayers or both.80 Elliot Brownlee described this
phenomenon as "[t] ax resistance," rather than tax evasion, because
it represented the combination of an antigovernment political
ideology and a successful economy in which government spending
only minimally appeared to aid the accumulation of economic
fortunes."1 As the president of the Pennsylvania Tax Conference
declared, "I believe one of the articles of faith of humanity is to beat
the tax collector." 2 Taxpayers live up to this article of faith, he
lamented, "with religious zeal." 3
One of the problems was that there were few mechanisms
available to reliably ensure the collection of taxes. Under a self-
assessment system, the principal enforcement method was to
require the taxpayer to swear to the accuracy of his return by
signing an oath.' In most cases, however, this had only a minimal
effect."5 Taxpayers with a conscience resorted to tactics short of
outright lying, including failing to sign the oath or having someone
else sign for them, but evasion continued virtually unabated.3"
According to one observer, "honorable citizens" looked at their tax
obligation as akin to "a Sunday-school donation."387 While tax
379. YEA.IZY, supra note 252, at 43.
380. Id. at 41.
381. W. Elliot Brownlee, The Transformation of the Tax System and the Experts, 1870-1930,
32 NATLTAXJ. 47,47 (Supp. 1979).
382. YEAMLEY, supra note 252, at 39.
383. I&
384. Id. at 41.
385. One expert concluded that returns accompanied by sworn oaths increased the average
estimate by ten to fifteen percent, but still fell far short of ensuring fair and complete
reporting. Id. at 42.
386. Id. at 41-42.
387. Seligman, supra note 204, at 646. One contemporary commentator reported that
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collectors and local assessors ostensibly served as a reality check for
false returns, political pressures often overwhelmed truly honest
law enforcement.3" As Professor Adams complained, accurate
assessment "is impossible so long as assessors are elected by the
people whose property they assess." 9 To combat this problem, some
cities resorted to the use of "inquisitors," or private collectors who
received a percentage of any property or income they added to the
tax rolls, but such mercenaries were either unduly expensive or
themselves corrupt."g Even in those jurisdictions where tax evasion
was strictly limited, wealthy individuals simply moved their
intangible assets and other personalty to "tax haven" jurisdictions
with friendly assessors.3 9' In Massachusetts, for instance, a quarter
of the value of the state's intangible wealth vanished from Boston
and magically reappeared in a few taxpayer-friendly towns.3
92
During the debates over the Civil War income tax, some members
of Congress worried that an income tax would push wealthy
taxpayers to shift their investments to nontaxable varieties or even
encourage them to move abroad altogether.-93
There was little hope that the federal government would have
much more success enforcing an income tax than the states had in
enforcing a property tax. As one contemporary observer explained,
"(mi]ultiplying oaths and increasing penalties has proved utterly inadequate for the correction
of the injustice of the present system and the consequent tendency toward the corruption of
character. The very terrors of the Inquisition would scarcely avail." William Hamilton Cowles,
in EQUITABLE TAXATION 83 (1892).
388. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (describing system of local assessment).
389. Adams, supra note 316, at 55.
390. YEARLEY, supra note 252, at 46-47.
391. Id. at 48-49.
392. Id. at 49.
393. One senator noted his concerns when he stated:
MTihe moment you carry that tax up to seven and a half per cent. or any other
excessive rate, [the man of wealth] says, 'this is unjust; it is not right I will
transfer my income into some other shape, or I will place it where it will be
beyond the reach of the government.' I have heard of several cases already
where large incomes have been transferred abroad, and I believe the fact to be
SO.
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2486 (1862) (statement of Sen. Chandler); see also CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1940 (1864) (statement of Rep. Morrill) ("I believe the result of
this differential system of duties upon men of large wealth will be to make them go abroad
in order to escape the taxation. On the boundary line of my own State I fear it may be so.").
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Itihe dependence for the disclosure of income in general is on the
same average degree of honest compliance with law, which has
hitherto proved insufficient for the success of State taxation in
pari materia. What reason is there for expecting any better
result under the act of 1894 than has been secured under a
multitude of State laws?"
The Civil War experience with an income tax served to underscore
this point. Although the income tax was generally more successful
than the state property tax,395 it fell far short of achieving its full
potential. One observer reported that "not more than one-tenth of
the actual taxable income of the country was reached" by the income
tax.3' This was especially true after the end of the war when "the
payment of the tax did not appeal so strongly to the patriotic
motives of the citizens.3 97
One of the principal complaints levied against the Civil War
income tax was that it was inquisitorial. 39 David Wells, a
Commissioner of Internal Revenue during the first income tax,
opined that the problem was that a tax return
necessarily disclosing to a greater or less degree his financial
condition to his business competitors and to a curious, gossiping
394. Dunbar, supra note 319, at 36. David Wells, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
at the time, complained that "not even the exhibits of the Patent Office showed the ingenuity
of Americans as well as their methods of evading taxes." PAUL, supra note 219, at 28
(paraphrasing Wells).
395. See Seligman, supra note 204, at 636-37 (comparingthe income tax collections in 1865
in New York with the property tax collections for the same year and concluding that [t]he
income tax yielded one-third as much again as a corresponding property tax").
396. KENNAN, supra note 62, at 256.
397. SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 471. Manyindividuals simply did not file returns. As one
observer noted:
In 1866 there was a marked falling off in the returns.... It may well be, then,
that there was, in fact, less income to be assessed in 1886 [sic] than there had
been the year before. At the same time it is probable that the tendency to evade
the tax and make incomplete returns of income was becoming stronger and more
generally operative.
Hill, supra note 18, at 444-45. By 1872, the number of returns filed annuallyhad fallen to only
72,000-from the already short 1866 level of 460,000. YEARLY, supra note 252, at 228.
398. See, eg., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1737 (1872) (statement of Rep. Rice)
(denouncing "[tihe cries of'espionage' and 'inquisitorial' that have been rung, with all their
changes, from 1863 to the present" because they applied equally to many existing forms of
taxation); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 720 (1871) (statement of Sen. Scott)
(characterizing the income tax as "unjust, unequal, inquisitorial, and unconstitutional").
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public, no man will willingly make; and he naturally regards it
as in the-nature of an outrage on the part of a government that
seeks to compel him to do it."'
"Hence," Wells continued, "the successful administration of an
income tax involves and requires the use of arbitrary and
inquisitorial methods and agencies which, perfectly consistent with
a despotism, are entirely antagonistic to and incompatible with the
principles and maintenance of a free government."' One such
"arbitrary and inquisitorial method" was to publish a list of
taxpayers and their self-reported incomes in the local newspapers
in the hopes of securing more accurate returnsY° 1 Another was the
practice of having an assessor complete the taxpayer's return
through a series of inquiries into all aspects of the taxpayer's
personal and financial affairs.' Not surprisingly, these methods
were a lightning rod for critics of the income tax. °3 Representative
Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts claimed that the government
"'undertakes by inquisition in collecting [the income tax] to treat
every man in the country as a rogue and rascal most likely to evade
the tax, and thereby succeeds only in compelling the conscientious,
the honest and the just men to pay .... "4N
2. The Declining Utility of Pass-Through Taxation
Enforcement of the income tax during the Civil War and
Reconstruction was not aided by the fact that Congress defined
income in the 1864 Act to include the undivided profits of a
399. David A. Wells, An Income Tax: Is It Desirable, 17 FORUM 1, 3 (1893).
400. Id.
401. One author has explained this idea more fully, stating:.
[1n the absence of any express legislative prohibition ofpublicity, and under the
pressure of newspaper enterprise, the custom was soon established ofpublishing
full lists of tax-payers and their incomes. In support of this practice it was urged
that its effect was to increase the assessment and secure more complete returns.
Hill, supra note 18, at 436; see also Wells, supra note 399, at 8 ("[One commissioner of
Internal Revenue instructed his officials to have them published in the pages of local papers,
'in order,' as he said, 'that the amplest opportunity may be given for the detection of any
fraudulent returns that may have been made.').
402. LANGENDERFER, supra note 24, at 751, 782-83.
403. Id.; Wells, supra note 399, at 8.
404. PAUL, supra note 219, at 24 (quoting Rep. Butler).
522 [Vol. 43:447
ENTITY THEORY AS MYTH
corporation. This is not surprising because a similar provision was
used by several states during this period, either to enforce a
dividends tax or in the definition of income, with unsatisfactory
results."5 In Virginia, for instance, "income" was defined in 1870 to
include "the share of the gains and profits of all companies, whether
incorporated or partnership, of any person who would be entitled to
the same if divided, whether said profits were divided or not."4°'
Despite this expansive definition, Virginia's income tax only
contributed $33,140 of the state's total revenues of $2,268,000 in
1873.40' By the end of the century, many of the states taxing
corporate profits, and virtually all of the European nations, chose to
impose some form of an income tax at the corporate level.4"
Part of the impetus behind the trend away from a shareholder
undivided profits tax was the difficulty of tracking a taxpayer's
share of undivided profits under turn-of-the-century accounting
systems. As Professor William Hewett later pointed out, "[tihe
measurement for tax purposes of such items as undivided profits...
would require a very high degree of perfection and uniformity in
accounting practice." 9 This level of sophistication in accounting
practices was not present in the 1920s, let alone the 1860s. 41° In
fact, one of the principle justifications for the failure to apply either
an exemption or proportional rates to the dividends tax during the
Civil War and Reconstruction was the difficulty of administering
such a system.41' Similarly, during the 1894 Senate debates over the
lack of a corporate exemption, Senator Vest rejected a proposal to
apply the exemption on a shareholder-by-shareholder basis because
of its administrative difficulty. As Vest asked, "How is the
corporation to settle with each individual stockholder in making up
405. See SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 197 ("[Slome commonwealths have even sought to
obviate the supposed difficulty by providing that the tax should apply to the dividends,
whether declared or merely earned and not divided.").
406. KINSMAN, supra note 146, at 50-51 (quoting 1869-70 Va. Acts ch. 189, § 16).
407. Id& at 56.
408. See SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 198-99.
409. WILLIAM WALLACE HEWETr, THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AND ITS APPLICATION IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 81 (1925).
410. See id (commenting on "the relatively unsatisfactory nature of accounting practice in
its present stage of development"); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic
and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 18 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) (lamenting
the "wide gap which stretches between theory and practice in the field of accounting").
411. See LANGENDERFER, supra note 24, at 508-09; SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 444.
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its net profits for the year? ... It seems to me it makes intricate and
complex the business of all these corporations, and opens the door
to great indirection, if not to fraud.""' The shareholder undivided
profits tax posed some of the same problems, leading Hewett to note
that although the provision was "carried out in practice as fairly as
the collectors found it possible ... it proved to be a rather onerous
task."413
3. The Corporate/Partnership Divide on Stoppage-at-the-
Source
In contrast to the general operation of the Civil War income and
undivided profits taxes, the dividends tax had proven relatively
efficient and uncontroversial. One representative boasted in the
Congressional Globe that the "tax is collected from corporations,
such as railroads and manufacturing companies, in a single sum
and in large amounts, with comparatively little or no cost.",14 While
this may have been a bit of an overstatement, it was not far from
the truth. One of the principal advantages in taxing income at the
source was that it potentially removed much of the tax evasion
motive from the equation. "The companies or persons paying the
rent, interest, or dividends which are to be taxed, independently of
their openness to inspection, are not actuated by the same motives
as the individual who is called upon to return the amount of his
income.""5
The success of the Civil War dividends tax was due largely to the
fact that businesses in the targeted industries generally operated in
corporate form. Unlike partnership distributions of earnings,
corporate dividends were visible and easy to track. Partnerships
divided their earnings on an irregular basis and without formal
notice.4"6 Generally, partners were entitled to draw upon part-
412. 26 CONG. REc. 6867-68 (1894) (statement of Sen. Vest).
413. HEWE-r, supra note 409, at 41.
414. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1736 (1872) (statement of Rep. Rice).
415. Dunbar, supra note 319, at 38; see also Moore, supra note 332, at 762 (arguing that
assessing "all corporate taxes to the corporation instead of to its shareholders, certainly
appears to he the better method. It is simpler, both to understand and to apply, it does not
give such opportunities for evasion of taxes, and it does not necessitate so many special
exceptions and provisions").
416. See THEOPHiLUS PARSONS, LAWS OF BUSmNESS FORALLTHE STATES OF THE UNION WITH
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nership earnings in advance of such divisions of profit." In
contrast, under state corporation law, dividends had to be formally
declared by the officers of the corporation. 18 The officers recorded
the declaration of dividends by including them in the minutes of
the board of directors and a notice was frequently published in
a financial newspaper or trade journal." By taxing corporate
dividends, rather than partnership earnings, the most inquisitorial
aspects of the income tax were avoided. Thomas Cooley, in his
Treatise on the Law of Taxation, explained that "ftlaxes on
[dividends are more easily collected and do not usually involve
inquisitorial proceedings. Dividends come from corporations whose
proceedings are usually semi-public, and while the privacy of
individuals is not invaded, neither are the demands of the
government liable to serious evasions."42 Representative Wilson
saw this as one of the chief benefits of a federal income tax on
corporations, noting that "the ascertainment of those earnings
would generally be easy and reasonably accurate, and free from the
FoRMS AND DIRECTIONS FOR ALL TRANSACTIONS 232-33 (1874) (stating that a common form
of partnership agreement provided "that all such gain, profit, and increase, as shall come,
grow, or arise, for or by reason of the said trade, or business as aforesaid, shall be from time
to time, during the said term, equally and proportionably divided between them the said
copartners, share and share alike").
417. Id. at 233 (quotingfroma clause often added to the traditional partnership agreement:
"That it shall be lawful for each of them to take out of the cash of the joint stock the sum of
- quarterly, to his own use, the same to be charged on account....'!).
418. See Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76, 78 (1875) ("A right to a dividend from the
profits of a corporation is no debt until the dividend is declared."); H.W.R., Dividends, 9 CENT.
L.J. 161, 163 (1879) ("The right of a stockholder to share in the surplus of profits is in the
nature of an inchoate right, until a distribution or dividend has been actually declared by the
proper officers of the corporation."). This rule originated as part of the desire to protect
against the impairment of capital and the accompanying demise of the premises of the grant
of limited liability. Donald Kehl, The Origin and Early Development of American Dividend
Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 36,41 (1939).
419. See, e.g., 40 COM. &FIN. CHRON. & HUNTfSMERCHANTMAG. 59 (1885) (publishing the
Annual Report for the Buffalo, New York & Philadelphia Railroad, including a description of
dividends paid); id. at 19 (listing a compilation of recent dividends announced by corporations
in the railroad, banking, insurance, and other miscellaneous industries); 22 COMM. & FIN.
CHRON. & HUNT's MERCHANT MAG. 41 (1876) (publishing the Annual Report for New York
Central & Hudson Railroad, including a description of dividends paid); id. at 11 (listing a
compilation of recent dividends announced by corporations in the railroad, banking, and
insurance industries).
420. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATisE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 22 (1876).
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offensive inquisition so much declaimed against in the case of the
individual."42'
Other countries contemporaneously recognized the advantage of
using stoppage-at-the-source methods for taxing corporate, but not
partnership, investments. In France, for example, the government
replaced a general income tax with taxes tied to the presence of the
indicia of income such as the receipt of interest or dividends on
corporate securities.4 22 To avoid the potential introduction of the
"personal inquisitorial features" associated with a general income
tax, the French dividends tax was not applied to "associations of
partnership, nor private obligations or mortgages."' 2 Thus, the
corporation, rather than the partnership or some other noncorporate
entity, was a uniquely appropriate target for the imposition of
stoppage-at-the-source principles.
The unique advantages of a corporate tax were so well
appreciated that the original proposals for a new source of federal
revenue at the end of the nineteenth century, much like the state
movement to replace property taxes with a tax on corporations,
envisioned a tax on income from corporate investments only. In his
State of the Union address in 1893, President Grover Cleveland
endorsed a House Ways and Means Committee recommendation
that Congress adopt "a small tax upon incomes derived from certain
corporate investments."'2' Soon after, Treasury Secretary John
Carlisle echoed this recommendation in his address to Congress,
proposing a tax on incomes "derived from investments in stocks and
bonds of corporations and joint stock companies" as one manner of
"most conveniently and justly" making up the shortfall from tariff
reform.' Representative William Wilson, the Chair of the Ways
and Means Committee, also jumped onto the emerging bandwagon
with the publication of his article, The Income Tax on Corporations,
in January of 1894.426 In it, he lamented the already high
consumption taxes on the poor, noting that "[tihe balance of taxation
421. William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. REV. 1, 7 (1894).
422. Wells, supra note 399, at 4-5.
423. Id.; see also SELIGMAN, supra note 125, at 203.
424. GROVER CLEVELAND, First Annual Message, in 9 A COMPHATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 434, 460 (1899).
425. RA7NER, supra note 26, at 174 (citation omitted).
426. Wilson, supra note 421.
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ought to be weighted by some taxes drawn from the property of the
country."' 7 Wilson suggested that this could be accomplished while
still producing "a revenue sufficient to cover a large part of the gap
now opening between receipts and expenditures" by imposing a
small tax on "the incomes or earnings of corporations. " 428 Perhaps
in recognition of the fact that a corporate tax does not effectively
reach a shareholder's ability to pay except as part of a com-
prehensive income tax scheme, 29 the tax on income from corporate
investments was eventually expanded to include an individual
income tax in the 1894 Act." ° Although the 1894 Act eliminated the
return requirement only for those individuals with nondividend
income of less than $3500,"1 the corporate tax combined with other
measures to help reduce the concerns about the inquisitorial nature
of the income tax.3 2
C. Simplifying the Tax on Corporate Wealth
The last major change to the 1864 Act structure for the taxation
of corporate income occurred in the Senate. As drafted by the Senate
Finance Committee, the bill dropped the dividends/undistributed
profits tax scheme in favor of a direct tax on the net profits or
income of corporations.' This language ultimately became part of
the 1894 Act as passed and is considered a substantial departure
from the 1864 Act.' The reason that the 1894 Act's corporate
income tax is considered a radical change, however, is because it is
compared to the 1864 Act's shareholder undivided profits tax rather
than the dividends/undistributed profits tax contained in the 1864
Act and the 1894 House bill. When this latter comparison is made,
427. Id at 7.
428. Id
429. McCrea, supra note 309, at 493-94.
430. RATNER, supra note 26, at 174-75.
431. See Dunbar, supra note 319, at 41 (noting that the corporate tax did not exempt a
considerable number of individuals from filing a return).
432. Id (citing the desire for 'the increased facility of collection" as one of the principal
grounds for the adoption of the tax); see also Seligman, supra note 204, at 624 (one such
measure was a provision barring the publication or disclosure of any information obtained
from the returns).
433. 26 CONG. REC. 6831 (1894).
434. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556; Yin, supra note 86, at 146
(discussing divergence from 1864 Act).
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the corporate income tax becomes a natural progression in the quest
to reach shareholder income.
It is not entirely accurate to portray the 1894 Senate bill and the
final Act as the first federal measures to target corporate income
directly. The 1864 Act's dividend tax directly targeted the
undistributed profits and sums added to surplus of companies in
specified industries. Given that the use of industry classifications
was considered to be a method of targeting corporations,"5 the
undistributed profits tax was in effect a direct tax on corporations.
Furthermore, the 1894 House bill's undistributed profits tax was
even more clearly a direct tax on corporations since it applied to
corporations generally. Despite this reality, however, contemporary
observers did not view the undistributed profits component of the
dividends tax as imposing a corporate income tax. As Joseph Hill
pointed out, the dividends/undistributed profits tax "was essentially
a part of the income tax, and was so regarded, being in effect an
assessment on the income of the stockholder or bondholder, who
received his interest or dividends diminished by the amount of the
tax.""' From the perspective of the modern reader, the failure to
recognize the undistributed profits portion of the dividends tax as
a direct tax on the corporation appears to be a disconnect between
perception and reality.3 7
From the perspective of the contemporary observer of corporate
dividend practices, however, the apparent disconnect disappears.
Today, most corporations distribute no more than half of their net
earnings in the form of dividends and many" fail to pay any
dividends at all. 8 By contrast, nineteenth-century corporations and
their shareholders and bondholders considered dividends to be
nearly essential. With illiquid or nonexistent markets, dividends
served the important functions of setting a market valuation and
435. See supra text accompanying notes 339-45.
436. Hill, supra note 18, at 427.
437. To put it more precisely, it appears to be a disconnect between perception and reality
to call the corporate income tax a tax on corporations, but not call the undistributed profits
tax a tax on corporations. It is true that economists might conclude that neither constitutes
a tax on corporations.
438. BASIN & MXRANTI, supra note 241, at 18-19. In fact, "during most of this century,
there was a strong tax inducement for corporations to adopt a 'no dividend' policy." RoBEaR
W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATEmALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPs 410 (5th ed. 1994).
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providing investors with a source of liquidity comparable to debt
instruments.439 Congress operated under the assumption that the
vast majority of corporations distributed virtually all of their net
earnings in the form of dividends."'
In an environment in which dividends represented substantially
all of a corporation's net income, it is not surprising that the
undistributed profits portion of the dividends tax was not viewed as
a tax on the corporation. It was merely an enforcement mechanism
for the dividends tax. As Senator Hill acknowledged during the
debate over the lack of a corporate exemption, "nobody objects to the
bill taxing the undivided surplus of corporations. If a corporation
sees fit to accumulate a large surplus instead of dividing it among
its stockholders, it can be reached by the bill and nobody objects to
it.""' The undistributed profits tax, therefore, was both easily
avoided and unlikely to ever be applied. Corporations simply had to
follow existing custom and distribute substantially all of their
profits to shareholders.
The Senate bill's adoption of a corporate income tax was viewed
as a measure simplifying, rather than replacing, the dividends/
undistributed profits tax. Senator Vest, the person responsible for
the new language, explained that
[ilnstead of making the corporation a collector simply for the
Government, we have endeavored to simplify the bill and, in my
judgment we have strengthened it, by putting the tax directly
upon the corporation and then allowingthe corporation to adjust
its relations with its own stockholders as it sees proper.442
The Senate bill combined the separate dividend and undistributed
profits tax provisions into one step.' 3 Levying a tax on the
corporation directly left the dividend decision to the corporation and
its stockholders and allowed the federal government to remain
neutral on this score.'
439. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 241, at 18-19.
440. See 26 CONG. REC. 6869 (1894) (statement of Sen. Allison).
441. Id, at 6873 (statement of Sen. Hill).
442. Id at 6866 (statement of Sen. Vest).
443. Id at 6880 (statement of Sen. Chandler) (asserting "the Senator from Missouri seems
to have thought that he could roll all those sections into one" by imposing an income tax).
444. This decision was something that corporations and shareholders had already
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As a practical matter, legislators still viewed the corporate income
tax as the equivalent of a tax on shareholder income. Senator
Allison agreed with the claim that a direct federal income tax on
corporations was unprecedented,' but contended that the Senate
bill was little more than a dividend tax except that it "provides that
these corporations shall also pay a tax upon surplus earned during
the year."' 6 This was of no practical import, however, because as
the Senator explained, the tax on such surplus
will be an infinitesimal amount as respects all the great
corporations and the little corporations of our country, because
there is nothing carried to the surplus account except in the-case
of national banks, where they are obliged to carry a certain
portion of their earnings to surplus from year to year and
perhaps other banks and insurance companies. But as to the
great body of the corporations of our country they make
dividends covering practically [all] their earnings each year."'
Because of contemporary corporate dividend policies, the Senate bill
was thought to be an attempt to streamline the House bill's
dividend tax.' In both cases, the corporate tax was part of an effort
to reach shareholder income.
This shareholder-centered view of the corporate income tax also
appeared to be in accord with contemporary economic thought on
the question. Edwin Seligman reported in his essay The Taxation of
undertaken during the Civil War and Reconstruction when many corporations chose not to
withhold the tax from dividends and instead paid it out of surplus. See Seligman, supra note
138, at 672 n.1.
445. Senator Allison acknowledged this point when he said:
We did not undertake to tax corporations as respects their income in 1864 or
1868. We simply used the corporations as instrumentalities on behalf of the
Government to gather in the money. Instead of utilizing and using the collectors
and deputy collectors of the country we required them to make return and pay
the tax, and they in turn turned on their stockholders, and were authorized to
deduct from bonds and from stock as well.
26 CONG. REc. 6869 (1894).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. There were several potential problems with the bill's language, not including the
failure to provide an exemption, which complicated the question of whether the Senate bill
actually would reach the same result as the House bill. Foremost among these potential
problems was the awkward definition of "net profits" as "income above ordinary working or
operating expenses." 26 CONG. RFc. 6881 (1894) (statement of Sen. Chandler).
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Corporations, first published in 1890, that "[ilt is generally assumed
that the tax on the corporation is a tax on the shareholder or
bondholder." 9 Assuming that corporate income is part of a general
scheme of income taxation, so that the tax impacts the value of all
investments and not merely corporate securities, Seligman
concluded that "the tax on the corporation is a tax on the investor.
To tax both corporation and individuals on their income would
hence really be double taxation."50 Although the courts often
approached the question from the more legalistic entity theory
perspective, with varying results,5 l economists and policymakers at
the state and federal level tended to view a corporate tax as the
economic equivalent of a tax upon the shareholders.5 2
Thus, far from representing radical change, contemporary
observers saw the corporate income tax as a broadened version of
the 1864 Act's dividend/undistributed profits tax. Even the fiercest
opponents to the corporate income tax based their argument in part
on its redundancy with the individual income tax.' "I see no reason
why there should be any special clause taxing the incomes of
corporations," said one senator, because "everything that is income
and the profit of a corporation is taxed by an individual income
tax."' The premises for this conclusion may have been
449. Seligman, supra note 138, at 671.
450. Id at 673. This assessment survived the inspection of the proposals for a corporate
tax. During the debates, Senator Gallinger offered an excerpt of an article from theNew York
Tribune in which the writer concluded that "[sluch a tax on the earnings of corporations is,
in fact, a tax on every stockholder of such corporations." 26 CONG. REc. 3894 (1894).
451. As one commentator of the era observed:
The judicial decisions are far from unanimous in declaring the taxation of shares
and property to be double taxation, or in disallowing it. This may be explained,
apart from the conservatism of most courts, to the fact that the older decisions
often represent a period offinancial development now passed, when the statutes
also may have expressly required such double taxation.
WALKER, supra note 73, at 67.
452. Id at 64-65.
453. 26 CONG. REc. 6880 (1894) (statement of Sen. Chandler) ("[Niever, until the Senator
from Missouri undertook the task, has there been any attempt to roll an income tax upon
individuals and an income tax upon corporations into the same paragraph of the same bill of
legislation.").
454. Id at 6881.
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questionable, 5 but the conclusion itself discloses the shareholder,
rather than corporate, focus of the first corporate income tax.
The focus on shareholder wealth in the 1894 Act continued in
subsequent state and federal tax measures involving corporations.
In 1903, the Wisconsin State Tax Commission reported that
Itihe wealth of the country in personalty consists largely of
investments in corporate securities, stocks, and bonds in
railroad and other corporations which are not and cannot be
reached for taxation to the holders by the severest and most
inquisitorial laws. The taxation of corporations as legal entities
is the only recourse.4"
In 1909, when President Taft proposed a federal excise tax on
corporations that was measured by income, he admitted that it was
a second-best alternative to the individual income tax barred by
Pollock.457 Supporters of this proposal emphasized its ability "to
455. The failure to grant an exemption to corporations to match the one permitted for
individuals served to disconnect the individual and corporate taxes. See Taylor, supra note
3, at 269 ("The only real problem with the statute's integration regime was its failure to
provide any credit to individuals who received dividend income and who found themselves
under the $4,000 exemption.").
456. McCrea, supra note 309, at 493 n.1 (citation omitted).
457. 44 CONG. REc. 3344 (1909) (message from President Taft). Taft also spoke of"[alnother
merit" of the excise tax-"the federal supervision which must be exercised in order to make
the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations." I&
It is true that Taft suggested that such a tax was based on the grant or concession theory
of the corporation, in that it was "an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business as an
artificial entity and of freedom from a general partnership liability enjoyed by those who own
the stock." 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909). This, however, was merely an attempt to conform to
the Court's statements regarding the ability to use an excise tax on the privilege of doing
business in lieu of an income tax. See Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397,
413 (1903) (upholding a tax on the gross receipts of sugar refiners as a constitutional excise
tax); Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635-37 (1895) (noting that its
decision striking down the 1894 income tax as unconstitutional did not mean that an excise
tax on the privilege of doing business would be unconstitutional). Most commentators seemed
to recognize the artificiality of the grant or concession period by this time. For example, one
official report claimed that the reply to the grant or concession theory rationale for corporate
taxation
is, substantially, that in these days corporations should be considered, not as
abnormalities, but as normal and necessary forms for doing business ... that
hence in creating corporations a State should be considered as performing a duty
rather than as granting a privilege. [Tihe property and the business of
corporations, except in so far as that property and that business differ from
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reach the great accumulated wealth of the country, or its earnings,
engaged in corporate enterprise.""" The focus did not fully shift to
the corporation until 1936, when Congress included dividends in
income while retaining the existing corporate income tax.'5 9 Even
this, however, was part of President Roosevelt's attempt to target
the evasion of the individual income tax through the retention of
corporate profits.' Thus, the early history of the corporate income
tax belies the traditional entity-theory explanation for its origins.
CONCLUSION
The early corporate income tax not only differs from our
traditional entity theory-based notion of the first federal income tax
on corporations, but it also differs greatly from the current system,
which subjects corporate income to two layers of tax and thereby
treats the corporation as a separate taxable entity. How did we
stray so far from the corporate tax's roots as a more efficient means
of reaching shareholder income? This question itself breaks down
into two related questions. First, why did Congress repeal the
exemption from the individual normal tax for dividends in the
Revenue Act of 1936 and thereby fully subject corporate income to
double taxation? Second, why does the separate corporate income
tax persist despite the steady stream of proposals to integrate it
with the shareholder income tax? While both of these questions are
beyond the scope of this Article, they may shed light on the
continuing implications of the entity-theory myth.
The latter question has received significantly more scholarly
attention from modern observers than the former. While a variety
of theories have been forwarded,"' one possible explanation for the
those of natural persons, should be taxed with no exceptional machinery.
Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the System of Taxing Manufacturing,
Mercantile, Transportation, and Transmission Corporations in the States of Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, in TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS: PART IlI-EATERN
CENTRAL STATES 3 (1911).
458. 44 CONG. REc. 3756 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands).
459. See Kwall, supra note 50, at 620. Previously, shareholders were entitled to exclude
dividends from the base, or "normal," individual tax. Id. at 619.
460. Id. at 619-20.
461. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 2, at 331-33 (listing possible explanations, including
entity theory, the popular belief that the corporate taxis another tax on capital, and the belief
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endurance of the separate corporate income tax is that the public
may have so accepted the entity-theory myth that it has become a
reality, at least in political terms. Popular opinion polls suggest that
the public considers the corporation a separate taxable entity while
at the same time rejecting the notion of double taxation. 2 This may
explain why the government has been receptive to some complete or
partial integration proposals, such as the shareholder credit,
dividend deduction, and dividend exclusion methods, 63 while
rejecting as politically impossible more radical methods such as a
mark-to-market system or a shareholder allocation approach similar
to that used for partnerships.' The former proposals would
preserve the existing corporate income tax, even if only in limited
form, while the latter proposals would blur or completely eliminate
the line between the corporation and its shareholders for tax
purposes.' Under this view, entity theory may not have been
responsible for the original corporate income tax, but it would be at
least partially responsible for its continued existence.
Another possibility raised in a number of recent law review
articles is that the persistence of the separate corporate income tax
and the double taxation of corporate income is connected to the
that politicians like the corporate tax because it acts as a "hidden tax7).
462. Id. at 333-34 (reporting that between sixty-five to eighty percent of those polled
supported an increased corporate income tax while only twenty-nine to thirty-seven percent
support double taxation); see also supra note 92 (discussing public views).
463. See generally U.S. DEPr OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INcoME ONcE (1992) (describing potential
integration proposals); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT-INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INcOME T~m--REPRTER's
STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 3-4 (1999).
464. See Graetz & Warren, supra note 2, at 1769. For examples of the mark-to-market
approach in which all shareholders, or shareholders in only public corporations, are taxed on
the annual rise in value of their stock and the corporate tax is eliminated entirely or limited
to public corporations, see Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-To-Market and Pass-through
Corporation-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995) and Michael S.
Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1996). The shareholder
allocation method, in which each shareholder is allocated his or her pro rata share of the
corporation's tax items for the year, is similar to the pass-through taxation applied to
partnerships.
465. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 464, at 290 (suggesting that the dividend deduction
method "presupposes ... that the corporation is a meaningful taxable entity" while this
Article's proposal would reject that orthodoxy).
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problem of agency cost.' In its strongest articulation, double
taxation becomes an ally of corporate management because it helps
persuade shareholders to allow managers to retain earnings and
invest them free of substantial monitoring.46 7 Stated more
moderately, fighting double taxation is of considerably lower value
to managers than trying to secure research and investment
credits.' s In either case, managers are much less inclined to lobby
actively for the passage of one of the many integration proposals
that have arisen over the years. 469 Nor are they likely to attempt to
counter the remnants of the entity-theory orthodoxy that may
explain the public's continued support for the corporate income
tax.47° The persistence of the classical system of corporation taxation
therefore may be due to a combination of public approval and
manager acquiescence.
The origin of double taxation has generated little modern in-
quiry,' 71 but a preliminary review of the circumstances surrounding
the repeal of the dividend exemption in 1936 suggests that it also
466. See, e.g., Arlen & Weiss, supra note 2, at 336; John K. McNulty, Reform of the
Individual Income Tax by Integration of the Corporate Income Tax, 46TAXNOTES 1445,1446
(1990); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and StockholderAbdication: Missing Factors
in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 1034 (1992); James R. Repetti, The
Misuse of Tax Incentives toAlign Management-ShareholderInterests, 19 CAIDOZOL.REv. 697,
716 (1997); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 410,411 n.8 (2000); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration: The Proper Wayto
Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAX NOTES 637,638-39 (1985); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three
Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 157,173 (1997).
467. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 2, at 348-49 (describing this argument, which has come
to be known as the "free cash flow" theory).
468. See id- at 336.
469. Over the years, at least four integration methods have received serious consideration:
(1) The shareholder allocation method in which each shareholder is allocated his or her pro
rata share of the corporation's tax items for the year;, (2) the shareholder credit or dividend
deduction methods, which involve either giving shareholders a credit for taxes paid by the
corporation or giving the corporation a deduction for dividends paid; (3) the dividend exclusion
method in which shareholders are entitled to exclude dividends from income; and (4) the
partial or complete mark-to-market method in which all shareholders, or shareholders only
in public corporations, are taxed on the annual rise in value of their stock and the corporate
tax is eliminated entirely or limited to public corporations. See generally AMERICAN LAW
INSTrTUTE, supra note 463, at 3-4; Graetz & Warren, supra note 2, at 1769.
470. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 2, at 331.
471. For a brief attempt to describe what occurred in 1936, see Kwall, supra note 50, at
619-20.
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may have arisen because of the agency cost problem.47 The dividend
exemption was removed as part of a plan to combat the corporate
"hoarding" of earnings. Originally, President Roosevelt proposed
replacing the corporate income tax with an undistributed profits tax
and subjecting distributed income to the shareholder normal and
surtax rates only. 3 In response to corporate managers' complaints
that the undistributed profits tax constituted an unwarranted
intrusion into the operation of businesses and would fail as a
revenue-raiser, Congress compromised by retaining both the
corporate income tax and a more modest undistributed profits tax.
Not coincidentally, opponents attempted to set the undistributed
profits tax rate equal to the individual normal tax on dividends,
thus counteracting the distributive pressure of the tax. In effect,
managers appeared to be willing to trade double taxation for a
reduction in the threat posed to them by the undistributed profits
tax.
The agency cost explanation suggests that the entity-theory myth
may have powerful allies. Corporate managers may help to prop up,
or at least fail to reject, the entity-theory explanation because the
existence of a separate corporate income tax furthers their own
goals. Given the assumptions regarding dividend policies underlying
the adoption of the corporate income tax,474 it should not be
surprising that the manager-shareholder relationship has become
critical. Senator Vest's original notion that the switch from a
dividends/undistributed profits tax to a corporate income tax would
"allow[ ] the corporation to adjust its relations with its own
stockholders as it sees proper" worked well when virtually all
earnings were distributed as dividends as a matter of business
custom. 5 Now that dividends are a matter of practical discretion
for corporate management, especially a management that is
increasingly separate from ownership, the corporation can be only
vaguely described as a proxy for its shareholders. In this environ-
472. This is a brief summary of a much larger work currently in progress. See Steven A.
Bank, Corporate Managers and the Rise of Double Taxation (work in progress) (copy on file
with The William & Mary Law Review).
473. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDFNT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 418, at 3
(1936); see also Pratt, supra note 2, at 1115.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 439-41.
475. See supra note 442.
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ment, reformers may have to do more than simply debunk the
entity-theory myth in order to secure political support for their
proposals. They may also have to bridge the gap between corporate
managers and their shareholders with respect to the integration of
the corporate and individual income taxes.
